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“It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mistaking . . .
the proper limits of the relaxation of the rules for determining the
unreasonableness of restraints of trade, have set sail on a sea of doubt
1
. . . .” William Howard Taft
“Without further elaboration, reasonableness is too vague a standard to
guide the businessman’s actions or the judge’s discretion. Such
openness is a mixed blessing. Unbounded by technical limitations, it
reaches every evil. But unless disciplined by the purposes of antitrust
2
laws, it is a vagrant standard.” Phillip E. Areeda
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INTRODUCTION
Courts resolve antitrust cases by applying various modes of
analysis.3 These modes range across a spectrum from so-called “full
blown” rule of reason analysis at one end to per se condemnation at the
other.4 Per se rules condemn limited categories of conduct by applying a
conclusive presumption of net anticompetitive effects, while rule of
reason analysis requires a court to engage in case-specific evaluation of
evidence bearing on actual or predictable competitive effects.5 Although
the per se rules have obvious advantages of clarity, administrability, and
predictability, the sorts of conduct falling under these rules have been
narrowed in recent years as courts have become more wary of
condemning legitimate competitive conduct.6 For example, although
vertical price restraints and certain vertical non-price restraints were per
se illegal for roughly 100 years, recent cases have established that all
vertical price and non-price restraints are to be evaluated based upon
some degree of analysis of the defendant’s market power or ability to
affect market competition, as well as a contextual review of the
competitive effects of the challenged conduct. Thus, the rule of reason
now applies to all antitrust matters other than hard-core cartel cases
involving horizontal price fixing or market allocations.7 Although
horizontal group boycotts and tying arrangements remain nominally
subject to per se condemnation, even these offenses are evaluated more

3.
4.
5.
6.

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769 (1999).
Id.
Id. at 763.
The Supreme Court has over the past three decades relegated all vertical
restraints to rule of reason analysis, thus removing vertical maximum and minimum
price fixing, as well as vertical territorial restraints, from their prior analysis under per
se rules. See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365 (1967), to extend rule of reason
analysis to vertical territorial restraints); State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)
(overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), to
extend the rule of reason to maximum resale price fixing); Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (further overruling Dr. Miles to apply
rule of reason analysis to minimum resale price fixing). The Court has also expressed
reluctance in some cases to find that horizontal price fixing should be condemned, if at
all, under per se analysis. See, e.g., Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 769.
7. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886 (“Restraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal
agreements among competitors to fix prices . . . or to divide markets . . . .”) (citations
omitted).
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cautiously under a hybrid approach in which the court engages in market
power analysis or an evaluation of proffered business justifications.8
At the same time, the broadening role for rule of reason analysis
has been accompanied by Supreme Court decisions that have obscured
the meaning and proper application of the rule, leaving lower courts
with no clear standards.9 Indeed, the rule of reason is no rule at all, but
rather a set of vague and inconsistent objectives that a court should set
for itself in evaluating conduct under an antitrust challenge.10 That is, the
“rule” merely directs the court to condemn conduct only where doing so
will achieve certain purposes, such as protecting marketplace
competition.11 The various objectives are supposed to be achieved by
balancing harms against benefits to competition and weighing such
ineffables as the corporate purpose behind the conduct, its history, the
marketplace context, and the experience of courts with similar
restraints.12 Furthermore, it is now explicit that the rule of reason
provides no set boundaries around the depth or rigor of the legal and
economic analysis required to decide an antitrust case. Instead, a court
presented with an antitrust claim must decide for itself how much
analysis is appropriate for the case before it: “What is required . . . is an
enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and
logic of a restraint.”13 Courts and agencies are frequently overruled for
having selected a level of inquiry that the reviewing court later deemed
to be too deep or too shallow. The reasons offered for these reversals in
many cases offer little guidance for future cases.
The rule of reason evolved away from its former dichotomy with
per se rules as courts became persuaded that economics should entirely
supplant other values, such as marketplace fairness, wealth distribution,
political concerns, and individual freedom, and at the same time grew
8.
9.

Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
See, e.g., Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1180 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that the conduct in question, revenue-sharing among rivals, could not
categorically be addressed under either per se rules or abbreviated rule of reason
analysis, thus adopting a newly-fashioned “quick-look-plus-per-se-minus” mode of
analysis).
10. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of
Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009) (arguing that the rule of reason has so little
content as to violate basic rule of law norms).
11. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 779-80.
12. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918).
13. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 781.
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concerned that the certainty and predictability of the per se rules are
often outweighed by their potential to condemn legitimate competitive
conduct.14 Inherently, the rule of reason invites a more nuanced analysis
than the more rigid per se rules, but there is a cost associated with
expanding the rule of reason’s scope. Certainty and predictability, and
perhaps even deterrence, to some extent, give way to case-specific rule
of reason evaluations; and the cost of those evaluations increases.15
The result has been an abandonment of categorical antitrust
analysis, which was once its mainstay.16 In an earlier time, the analysis
of a Section 1 case began, and frequently ended, with the
characterization of the alleged restraint.17 If the restraint was in the
nature of an exclusive dealer territory assignment agreed to between a
manufacturer and a favored dealer, it was so characterized as a vertical
territorial allocation and condemned per se.18 The process of
characterization was thus the focus of the litigation of claims under
Section 1.19 These categories began to blur along with the courts’
emerging concern that antitrust law may condemn ,and therefore deter,
efficient marketplace conduct. Thus, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.(“BMI”),20 an agreement that was
price fixing “in the literal sense” was not characterized as prohibited
price fixing in recognition of the potential that the efficiencies of
musical composition rights clearing houses might more than offset the
limitations they represented to free and open competition among their
members.21 As discussed below, a few observers believe Section 1
analysis remains too rooted in categorization,22 but the Supreme Court

14. THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION AND POLICY 4-5
(John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 4th ed. 2004). Cf. HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 59 et. seq. (3d ed. 2005).
15. Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53
ANTITRUST L. J. 135, 155 (1984).
16. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 779.
17. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 55-65 (2007) (tracing the demise of the per se rule).
18. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
19. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008).
20. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
21. Id. at 8.
22. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 19.
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has clearly shifted from categorical analysis23 and has openly disparaged
its propensity to yield “false positive errors,” condemning conduct that
ought to be allowed.24
Cut loose from categorical analysis, the rule of reason is truly a
“vagrant standard.”25 The rule has always had an unbounded character,
as has been observed many times in the past. As a leading antitrust law
scholar observed in his antitrust law treatise:
Without further elaboration, reasonableness is too vague a standard
to guide the businessman’s actions or the judge’s discretion. Such
openness is a mixed blessing. Unbounded by technical limitations, it
reaches every evil. But unless disciplined by the purposes of antitrust
laws, it is a vagrant standard. Uninstructed by knowledge of the
economy generally or by experience with the particular market under
scrutiny, the judge or jury may respond to the parties’ relative
26
worthiness rather than concentrate on competitive effects.

However, the current problems with the rule of reason have little to
do with judges or juries failing to discipline their evaluation of conduct
with reference to the purposes of antitrust law. Instead, the rule is
inherently confusing, unadministrable, unpredictable, and its many
details have been poorly fleshed out by the Supreme Court.27 Many of
the most basic questions about the rule of reason remain needlessly
unanswered. As discussed later in this Article, after 100 years the courts
have not even gone so far to establish whether market power is a
necessary element of a rule of reason case and in fact have articulated
inconsistent answers to that basic question.28 Another unsettled matter is
just when a full-blown rule of reason analysis is “meet for the case.”29
23. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999) (“[T]here is generally
no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious
inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. What
is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details,
and logic of a restraint.”).
24. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (“[W]e have
previously hedged against false inferences from identical behavior”); Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)
(“The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability”).
25. Areeda, supra note 2.
26. Id.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81(1999).
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There is no clear articulation of a standard by which parties and courts
can predict how much analysis a case will entail. Also unclear is
whether actual anticompetitive effects or theoretical ones govern in any
particular case, since in at least the Cal. Dental decision Justice Souter
seemed to place a heavy burden on plaintiffs once the Court constructed
what amounted to purely speculative efficiency justifications. 30 These
seemingly basic elements of rule of reason analysis remain unsettled
after all this time. Thus, as the rule of reason has come to dominate
antitrust law, it has at the same time, produced a discordant body of case
law.
It was understandable why the rule of reason in earlier years might
have gone without much development as a result of the process of stare
decisis. Plaintiffs had more reason to pursue per se cases through trial,
and so the many obstacles in the way of rule of reason plaintiffs may
have resulted in a paucity of judicial decisions to give more content to
the rule of reason. However, the Supreme Court cases that gave the rule
of reason its dominant role in Section 1 litigation date back at least as far
as the landmark decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania in
1977, when the Court overturned its then-recent decision that had
declared vertical territorial restraints to be per se unlawful.31 For more
than three decades now, the rule of reason has continued its steady
ascent, and it now controls most antitrust litigation.32
One commentator noted as long ago as 1994, the rule of reason
“has no substantive content.”33 More recently, another scholar has
argued that current standards under Section 1 do not even live up to the
requirements of the rule of law, mainly by imposing sanctions on
citizens who have no way of predicting if their conduct is unlawful.34
That the rule of reason continues to lack substantive content is an everenlarging problem as the rule of reason has displaced per se analysis
considerably more since Mr. Piraino’s thoughtful article.35
It is of course desirable, indeed unavoidable, that the rule of reason
invites some degree of flexibility. Commerce, in a sense, is like a
flowing river. As Heraclitus noted 2500 years ago, “[n]o man ever steps
30.
31.

See generally id.
433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967)).
32. See supra note 6.
33. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard
for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (1994).
34. Stucke, supra note 10.
35. See supra note 6.
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in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same
man.”36 No two restraints are identical, and no two restraints are
imposed within identical marketplace contexts.37 Still, flexibility is not
the same as abject indeterminateness. Various critiques of the rule of
reason that predate the Court’s shift away from categorical analysis
raised concerns about the rule’s unbounded character.38 The boundaries
that categories established have now eroded to the point that the rule of
reason knows no meaningful boundaries. The administration of antitrust
litigation, business planning, and the efficacy of the law are all
adversely affected by this. If the particular categories that informed an
earlier antitrust jurisprudence are wanting, the solution is not to abandon
all content and leave judges and juries to make unguided decisions.
Instead, the categories need to be refined.
This Article presents a critique of the rule of reason and offers an
approach for restoring some of its content. It begins by reviewing the
historical development and expanding role of the rule of reason as
applied to horizontal restraints39 through the Supreme Court’s most
recent comprehensive explication of the rule in Cal. Dental.40 The
Article then offers a critique of the modern approach to rule of reason
analysis and explains its analytical incoherencies. The Article explores
the courts’ diverse and inconsistent applications of the rule of reason to
demonstrate how poorly the rule of reason standard works and to
identify specific areas that remain in doubt. Since the Federal Trade
Commission has attempted to reformulate the rule of reason within the
constraints of Board of Trade and Cal. Dental, its so-called “inherently

36. PLATO, CRATYLUS, in 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 191 (B. Jowett trans. & ed.
3d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1892).
37. Barbara Ann White, Countervailing Power - Different Rules for Different
Markets? Conduct and Context in Antitrust Law and Economics, 41 DUKE L.J. 1045,
1069 (1992).
38. See Piraino, supra note 33.
39. This article does not address the rule of reason in the vertical context, which
implicates a somewhat different set of considerations. However, the essential problems
with the rule of reason, particularly its vaccuity, are equally of concern in any context in
which the rule is applicable. To the extent that a clarified mode of analysis is required
for horizontal restraints as argued here, the same can be said for vertical restraints even
if the modes of analysis in the latter context may be more complex due to the greater
claims to competitive legitimacy that may be made for vertical arrangements.
40. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
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suspect” approach is considered a possible repair.41 Finally, the Article
concludes by proposing a complete reversal and repudiation of current
rule of reason doctrine and substituting it with a categorical approach
that will allow the business community, victims of antitrust violations,
government enforcers, and the courts a measure of transparency and
predictability.
I. THE EVOLUTION AND EXPANSION OF THE RULE OF REASON
The history of the rule of reason, and in fact of Section 1 doctrine
as a whole, can be seen as a trial-and-error evolution. It began with the
Court’s unqualified view of the prohibition against all restraints of trade
in Trans-Missouri Freight,42which the Court tempered in Standard Oil.43
Section 1 doctrine then developed into categorical modes of analysis
with the introduction of per se illegal categories of conduct. For an
extended period, the crux of antitrust analysis was a process of
categorizing conduct, placing it either into or outside of certain
categories that were deemed illegal per se.44 Since per se rules admitted
of no justifications for the conduct, categorization eventually became
more complex as the Court came to find value in evaluating the
economic context for conduct that literally qualified as per se illegality
but where rigid prohibition seemed potentially overbroad.45 Thus NCAA,
41. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’g In re
Polygram Holding, Inc., No. 9298, 136 F.T.C. 310 (2003); N. Tex. Specialty Physicians
v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’g In re N. Tex. Specialty Physicians, No.
9312, 140 F.T.C. 715 (2005); In re Realcomp II Ltd., 2009-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P
76784 (F.T.C. Oct. 30, 2009).
42. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897).
43. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
44. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 202-04 (West 2000).
45. An early example of the Court’s expression of concern about condemning
legitimate conduct under per se rules is found in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1979). There, the Court observed: “[t]o the Court of Appeals and CBS,
the blanket license involves ‘price-fixing’ in the literal sense: the composers and
publishing houses have joined together into an organization that sets its price for the
blanket license it sells. [Footnote omitted] But this is not a question simply of
determining whether two or more potential competitors have literally “fixed” a ‘price.’
As generally used in the antitrust field, ‘price-fixing’ is a shorthand way of describing
certain categories of business behavior to which the per se rule has been held
applicable. The Court of Appeals’ literal approach does not alone establish that this
particular practice is one of those types or that it is “plainly anticompetitive” and very
likely without ‘redeeming virtue.’ Literalness is overly simplistic and often overbroad.
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Professional Engineers,46 and other cases established a hybrid “quick
look” third mode of analysis.47 Nonetheless, the process of
categorization in antitrust cases remained essential. This introduction of
truncated rule of reason analysis, however, significantly blurred the
categories of conduct, and the Court began to question whether the
categorical approach really worked.48 Eventually in Cal. Dental, the
Court abandoned categories altogether and introduced a truly casespecific and more deeply contextual regime for Section 1 analysis.49 The
rule of reason now calls for an “enquiry meet for the case.”50
Coinciding with the trend toward blurring and then eliminating
categorical antitrust analysis, the Court also shifted away from most
vestiges of the per se rules, leaving only hard-core cartel activity subject
to them.51 The Court’s increasing skepticism about the economic
consequences of rigid per se rules led to the overturning of previously
long-standing per se prohibitions against vertical market allocations and
resale price maintenance.52 Aside from horizontal cartels, all conduct is
now subject to some degree of rule of reason analysis. The end result is
that the rule of reason has became considerably more important, but at
the same time much less clear and predictable in its application.
A. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF REASON
The rule of reason’s history has been traced too often to require
significant attention to it in this Article. However, it is worth pausing to
consider why the rule was adopted in the first place and how it evolved
into such an unworkable standard that governs the analysis of nearly all
alleged antitrust offenses.
When two partners set the price of their goods or services, they are literally ‘pricefixing,’ but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act. See United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U. S. 11 (1899).
Thus, it is necessary to characterize the challenged conduct as falling within or without
that category of behavior to which we apply the label ‘per se price-fixing.’ See id. That
will often, but not always, be a simple matter.
46. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof. Eng’rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
47. Id.
48. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110.
49. 526 U.S. at 779.
50. Id. at 781.
51. See generally supra note 6.
52. Id.
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
53
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be unlawful.

Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act based on
its literal meaning, and that all agreements in restraint of trade or
commerce were declared by Section 1 to be unlawful – an approach that
had more appeal as a matter of strict statutory construction than as a
matter of public policy.54 As the Court observed many years later,
“[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade,
restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.”55 The TransMissouri Freight56 decision thus portended to outlaw common
commercial arrangements, even if on balance they were efficient and
procompetitive.
Thus, fourteen years after Trans-Missouri Freight, the Court
adopted another approach for interpreting the statute, finding its
language sufficiently unclear as to justify judicial interpretation, and
calling on the common law to support the imposition of a rule of reason
to clarify the statute’s purportedly vague and undefined terms,
specifically the terms “restraint of trade or commerce.”57 The Standard
53.
54.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897) (“The
language of the act includes every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or
with foreign nations. So far as the very terms of the statute go, they apply to any
contract of the nature described. A contract, therefore, that is in restraint of trade or
commerce is, by the strict language of the act, prohibited . . . . If such an agreement
restrain trade or commerce, it is prohibited by the statute . . . .”). See also United States
v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898) (“Has not Congress, with regard to
interstate commerce, and in the course of regulating it, in the case of railroad
corporations, the power to say that no contract or combination shall be legal which shall
restrain trade and commerce by shutting out the operation of the general law of
competition? We think it has.”).
55. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918).
56. 166 U.S. 290.
57. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (“And as the
contracts or acts embraced in the provision were not expressly defined . . . it inevitably
follows that the provision necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which
required that some standard should be resorted to for the purpose of determining
whether the prohibitions contained in the statute had or had not in any given case been
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Oil decision gave no clear indication of what was meant by a “rule of
reason,” but evaluated various aspects of the Standard Oil trust by
reference to its “intent and purpose to exclude others” from competition,
the character of the defendants’ conduct, and the resulting extension of
power over the petroleum industry.58
During the same term, the Supreme Court described Standard Oil
to hold:
[T]hat as the words ‘restraint of trade’ at common law and in the law
of this country at the time of the adoption of the Anti-trust Act only
embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which
operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting
competition, or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which,
either because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the
evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade, that the
words as used in the statute were designed to have and did have a
59
like significance.

Thus, in its earliest formulation, the rule of reason took its direction
from the common law, and evaluated whether the intended or actual
effect of a challenged restraint unduly contravened the public’s interest
in “the free movement” of trade in the channels of interstate
commerce.60 The common law had long recognized the validity of
contracts that restrained trade, provided that they were “reasonable . . .
in reference to the interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in
reference to the interests of the public . . . .”61

violated. Thus, not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it
follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the
common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by
the statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether
in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which
the statute provided.”).
58. 221 U.S. at 75-76.
59. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
60. Id. at 180.
61. Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535
(H.L.) 565; see also Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 (K.B. 1711) (upholding a
baker’s covenant not to compete with the bakery he sold to the plaintiff for a period of
five years in a limited vicinity surrounding the business sold); Rogers v Parry, (1613), 2
Bulstr 136 (upholding as reasonable a joiner’s promise not to practice his trade from his
house for 21 years).
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One important early gloss on the rule of reason was provided by
Judge Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,62 where he
articulated what eventually became known as the ancillary restraints
doctrine.63 After tracing the common law rules applicable to agreements
not to practice one’s trade and not to compete with a business in a
contract for its sale, Judge Taft observed that to be lawful, the contract
that imposed some restraint on trade or competition:
[M]ust be one in which there is a main purpose, to which the
covenant in restraint is merely ancillary. The covenant is inserted
only to protect one of the parties from injury which, in the execution
of the contract or enjoyment of its fruits, he may suffer from the
unrestrained competition of the other. The main purpose of the
contract suggests the measure of protection needed, and furnishes a
sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity of such restraints
may be judicially determined. In such a case, if the restraint exceeds
the necessity presented by the main purpose of the contract, it is void
for two reasons: First, because it oppresses the covenantor, without
any corresponding benefit to the covenantee; and, second, because it
tends to a monopoly. But where the sole object of both parties in
making the contract… is merely to restrain competition, and enhance
or maintain prices, it would seem that there is nothing to justify or
excuse the restraint, that it would necessarily have a tendency to
monopoly, and therefore would be void… There is in such contracts
no main lawful purpose, to subserve which partial restraint is
permitted, and by which its reasonableness is measured, but the sole
object is to restrain trade in order to avoid the competition which it
64
has always been the policy of the common law to foster.

Under the ancillary restraints doctrine, the initial step involves
asking whether there is some legitimate agreement to which the restraint
is ancillary, and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonable in relationship
to the legitimate objectives of the parties.65 A restraint is unreasonable
under this approach either if it is “naked” and unconnected with any
legitimate transaction, or if the restraint is connected to something
legitimate but excessive for its purposes.66 This ancillary restraint
doctrine falls neatly out of common law cases that approved of a seller’s
covenants not to compete with the business being transferred, provided

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2006).
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282-83.
Id.
Id.
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that the restraint was reasonably limited in time and geographic scope to
permit the buyer to fully exploit the business without interference from
the seller.67
The ancillary restraint doctrine does not entirely encompass the rule
of reason, but provides a useful starting point for antitrust analysis of
many arrangements that are removed from the reach of per se rules.
However, even if a restraint that forms part of a legitimate transaction
fails to meet the ancillary restraint test, such as by being unduly
restrictive for the purpose intended, it may nevertheless be lawful,
where, for example, the parties obviously lack sufficient market power
to affect marketplace competition.68
B. BOARD OF TRADE
The most enduring explication of the rule of reason is found in
Justice Brandeis’ landmark opinion in Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago v. United States:69
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint is imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
70
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.

This statement of the rule of reason has guided the courts for nearly
100 years,71 as recently as this past term, providing the basis for the
Supreme Court’s ruling that professional sport league restraints should

67. Mitchell v. Reynolds, (1711) 1 P. Wms. 181 (Eng.); Dyer’s case (1414), 2 Hen.
fol. 5, pl. 26 (Eng.).
68. See Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7-8.
69. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
70. Id. at 238.
71. This language has been quoted by courts more than 240 times, based on a
LEXIS search of the text.
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be treated under the rule of reason on the ground that some cooperation
is necessary to make the end product available.72
Board of Trade marked an important departure from the ancillary
restraint approach in the Addyston Pipe decision, which had tied the
Sherman Act to the common law rule against restraints on trade.73
Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade considered relevant a variety of
questions going to the nature of the marketplace, the business involved
in the restraint, its history and most importantly the actual or probable
effects of the restraint, none of which had significance under common
law.74 The common law ancillary restraint rule was limited to an
examination of the parties’ intent and the relationship between their
legitimate business transaction and the restraint. Board of Trade shifted
the analysis toward a more modern economics approach that weighs the
actual or probable effect of a restraint by examining the relevant
economic market in order to assess the market power of the parties, and
thus their ability to have an impact on consumer welfare. Analysis of the
market “condition before and after the restraint is imposed” takes the
Court far more deeply into economic analysis of effects than was ever
contemplated by the ancillary restraint doctrine.
One can compare the approach in Board of Trade with the common
law by considering such cases as Mitchell v. Reynolds. Mitchell involved
the sale of a bakery under a covenant by the seller not to compete with
the buyer for a period of time in the same locale. The covenant not to
compete in this historic case was lawful under the common law rule
regardless of whether the parties had intended to assure the bakery’s
buyer of a local monopoly for a period of years, which may very well
have been the situation. Mitchell says nothing about the condition of the
relevant market for the baking trade in the locale because the only issue
was whether the restriction on the seller was minimally broad enough to
assure the buyer of the fruits of the acquisition transaction. The rule of
reason in Board of Trade might have yielded a different outcome if the
parties not only sought to protect the buyer’s legitimate interests but also
to assure it of a continuing monopoly; if the history of the baking trade
in the relevant market made clear that the seller was the buyer’s only
likely rival; if the buyer had previously started to enter the bakery
market to compete with the seller and was induced instead to purchase

72.
73.
74.

Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010).
Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. 231; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271.
Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
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the seller’s business at a price that shared the monopoly profits that
flowed from eliminating rivalry, and so on.
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PER SE CATEGORIES
The cases that announced the rule of reason contained in them the
seeds of the per se rules. Standard Oil attempted to reconcile the newly
announced rule of reason with its earlier more rigid denunciation of the
railroad cartels in Trans-Missouri Freight, where it found the restraints
to be ones for which “resort to reason was not permissible,”
[C]onsidering the contracts and agreements, their necessary effect,
and the character of the parties by whom they were made, they were
clearly restraints of trade within the purview of the statute, they
could not be taken out of that category by indulging in general
reasoning as to the expediency or nonexpediency of having made the
75
contracts . . . .

A dichotomy between rule of reason analysis and per se rules
emerged more clearly in United States v. Trenton Potteries,76 where the
Court held that price-fixing agreements could not be defended on the
ground that the price, as fixed, was asserted to have been a reasonable
one. In so holding, the Court signaled an irrebuttable presumption of
unreasonableness in price-fixing cases:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is
the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices,
whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the
market and fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable
price fixed today may through economic and business changes
77
become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.

By 1947, the Court was able to articulate unambiguously that price
fixing was per se unlawful: “Whatever justification particular pricefixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an
inquiry into their reasonableness.”78 This led to a categorical approach to
Section 1 analysis:

75.
76.
77.
78.

221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911).
273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
Id.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1947).
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There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis.
In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary
effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish their illegality—they are “illegal per
se.” In the second category are agreements whose competitive effect
can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business,
79
the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.

An essential step in any Section 1 case thus involved categorizing
the conduct under challenge. Is this challenged conduct price fixing, or
is it something that looks like price fixing but is instead more complex
and perhaps worthy of deeper analysis? Did the defendants’ concerted
refusal to deal with a supplier constitute group boycott conduct, or was
it properly categorized differently so as to require evaluation under a
rule less rigid? These sorts of categorization questions came to
predominate.
D. THE “QUICK LOOK” RULE OF REASON AND THE COURT’S
EMERGING DISSATISFACTION WITH CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS
The dichotomy between the rule of reason and the per se categories
of analysis was always blurred by the problems of characterizing
challenged conduct as fitting, or not fitting, into one of the per se
forbidden categories.80 As such, the Court found itself faced with cases
that challenged the categories of antitrust modes of analysis.81 Thus, the
establishment of common pricing for all copyrighted musical
compositions made available for licensing through the American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers and Broadcast Music Inc. was
rather obviously “price fixing” among the owners of the copyrights, but
was evaluated under the rule of reason after the Court refused to
characterize it as such.82 The problem, the Court noted, was that the
conduct involved price fixing in only a literal sense; the context was a
collaboration that provided a different product than any of the

79.
80.

Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 19, at 1225 (“One of the problems with
categorical analysis is that the boundaries of categories shift without logic or
warning.”).
81. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Nat’l Soc’y of
Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679.
82. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 8 (“[E]asy labels do not always supply ready
answers.”).
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collaborating participants could have marketed independently.83 Since
this new product needed a price, someone had to set it and doing so
should not be condemned as anticompetitive without an analysis of the
economic context in which the conduct took place – even though the
conduct was literally price fixing.84 The Second Circuit had condemned
the arrangement, which indicated that the categorical approach was
leading to undesirable results.85 The Supreme Court’s decision further
demonstrates that the Court was stretching to exclude the blanket
licenses from the “price fixing” category.86
Eventually, the very notion of the categorical dichotomy began to
unravel in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,87
where the Court applied rule of reason analysis to strike down a
professional association rule that discouraged competitive bidding on
the basis of price. Although the conduct was essentially a form of price
fixing, the court did not apply the per se rule, nor did it explain its
reasons for not doing so.88 The BMI problem was not present in
Professional Engineers where the price restraint applied to the separate
services provided by each independent professional, rather than to the
pricing of the distinct output of a joint venture among rival sellers.89
Nevertheless, the Court declined to apply either the per se rule or a fullblown rule of reason analysis.90 Instead, the Court stated that although
“no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the
anticompetitive character of such an agreement,” it was necessary to
evaluate the Association’s proffered justifications for its rule before
concluding that the restraint on price competition was a direct affront to
the Sherman Act.91 The analysis appeared to proceed without reference
to the usual categories of antitrust analysis.
In 1979, the Court seemed to rely on categorical analysis, but began
to recognize explicitly a third category of “truncated” rule of reason
analysis when it struck down the NCAA’s rules restricting the number
of football game television broadcast rights that any member team could
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 8-10.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8-9.
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Id. at 687.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 692, 695.
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sell and limiting price competition in bidding for television contract
arrangements.92 The Court struck down the rule as an unlawful restraint
on price and output, but declined to apply a straightforward per se
analysis noting that the industry of college football is one “in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
made available at all.”93 Nor did Justice Stevens delve into anything
resembling a fulsome rule of reason analysis, which would have
involved weighing the Board of Trade elements: evidence concerning
any peculiar facts about the industry; market conditions before and after
the restraint; the nature of the restraint and its probable and actual
effects; and the purpose behind the restraint and the problem it was
purportedly imposed in order to solve.94 Instead, the Court entertained
only the last of these factors by considering rather briefly the various
justifications offered by the NCAA.95 In adopting this approach and
deviating from Board of Trade, the Court observed in a famous
footnote:
Indeed, there is often no bright line separating per se from rule of
reason analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into
market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of
96
anticompetitive conduct.

After NCAA, even categorizing conduct as a “naked restraint” did
not resolve the extent of inquiry required.
E. CAL. DENTAL AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE CATEGORICAL
MODES OF RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
In Cal. Dental, the Supreme Court finally repudiated altogether the
notion that the rule of reason embodies a single unified substantive
standard and shifted it to an undefined process by which courts are to
proceed in evaluating alleged antitrust violations.97 At the same time, the
Court repudiated categorical modes of analysis that had governed
Section 1 since Trenton Potteries.98 Cal. Dental made clear that the
categorical approach was fully repudiated:
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id. at 101.
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113-15.
Id. at 103, n.26.
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-81 (1999).
273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect
are less fixed than terms like “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule of
reason” tend to make them appear. We have recognized, for
example, that “there is often no bright line separating per se from
rule of reason analysis,” since “considerable inquiry into market
conditions” may be required before the application of any so-called
“per se” condemnation is justified. “Whether the ultimate finding is
the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential
inquiry remains the same—whether or not the challenged restraint
enhances competition.” Indeed, the scholar who enriched antitrust
law with the metaphor of “the twinkling of an eye” for the most
condensed rule of reason analysis, himself cautioned against the risk
of misleading even in speaking of a “spectrum” of adequate
reasonableness analysis for passing upon antitrust claims: “There is
always something of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, but
the sliding scale formula deceptively suggests greater precision than
we can hope for . . . . Nevertheless, the quality of proof required
should vary with the circumstances.” P. Areeda, Antitrust Law
99
¶1507, p. 402 (1986).

F. EXPANSION OF THE RULE OF REASON
During this same period in which the categorical approach gave
way to a less definite one, the Court retreated from per se analysis
except as to the residual price fixing and market allocation offenses.100
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions express a decided ambivalence
about the relative benefits of per se rules as opposed to rule of reason
analysis.101 On the one hand, the Court has noted certain obvious
benefits of per se rules:
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of
restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to
the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for
an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation
99.
100.
101.

Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 781 (case citations omitted).
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435-36 (1990).
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (referring to
“false positives” and “false inferences” as concerns supporting a relaxation of standards
for motions to dismiss antitrust claims); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (limiting Section 2 liability to avoid
potential “‘false positive’ mistaken inferences that chill the very conduct the antitrust
laws are designed to protect”); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (noting that application of per se rules “raises the total cost of error” while
reducing costs of decision-making).

2012]

SAILING A SEA OF DOUBT

611

into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related
industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular
restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry so often wholly fruitless
102
when undertaken.

The Court also has made clear that administrative efficiency is not
the sole foundation for per se rules, observing that they are also
substantive rules having statutory force:
The per se rules in antitrust law serve purposes analogous to per se
restrictions upon, for example, stunt flying in congested areas or
speeding. Laws prohibiting stunt flying or setting speed limits are
justified by the State’s interest in protecting human life and property.
Perhaps most violations of such rules actually cause no harm. No
doubt many experienced drivers and pilots can operate much more
safely, even at prohibited speeds, than the average citizen…
In part, the justification for these per se rules is rooted in
administrative convenience. They are also supported, however, by
the observation that every speeder and every stunt pilot poses some
threat to the community. An unpredictable event may overwhelm the
skills of the best driver or pilot, even if the proposed course of action
was entirely prudent when initiated. A bad driver going slowly may
be more dangerous that a good driver going quickly, but a good
driver who obeys the law is safer still. So it is with boycotts and
price fixing… Every such horizontal arrangement among
103
competitors poses some threat to the free market.

Some earlier cases offered additional benefits of per se rules.
Topco, in particular, lauded the rules as necessary both for the business
community and to avoid immersing courts into matters beyond their
competency:
Without the per se rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid
them in predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be
legal and illegal under the Sherman Act. Should Congress ultimately
determine that predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it
can, of course, make per se rules inapplicable in some or all cases,
and leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory
104
in order to maintain a flexible approach.

102.
103.
104.

N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 433-34 (1990).
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (U.S. 1972).
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Notwithstanding the administrative and other benefits of per se
rules, the Court has overturned all per se rules that previously applied to
vertical price and non-price restraints, weakened the per se rule
applicable to tying by requiring proof of market power,105 and has
created no new per se rule in at least a half century.106 In Leegin
Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., the Court acknowledged its
“reluctance to adopt per se rules.”107 In balancing the trade-off between
efficient and predictable per se rules and the reduced error potential of
more thorough rule of reason analysis, the federal courts have
discernibly shifted to favor the latter.108 Reluctance to apply a rule that
might generate “false positive” antitrust condemnation has repeatedly
surfaced in recent opinions under both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.109 On balance, the battle between the per se rules and the rule of
reason has resulted in a “triumph” of the latter.110 Thus, aside from cases
involving hard-core cartel activity, all Section 1 cases are relegated to
Cal. Dental’s “continuum” rule of reason.
The Court’s doubts about the wisdom of per se rules are not new. In
Topco, Justice Blackmun concurred in the decision to condemn the
association’s market allocation rule, but only because he felt constrained
by stare decisis.111 Blackmun stated that the consequences of striking
down Topco’s rule would be harmful to the public interest, but
conceded: “The per se rule, however, now appears to be so firmly
established by the Court that, at this late date, I could not oppose it.
Relief, if any is to be forthcoming, apparently must be by way of

105. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1984) (“[A]ny
inquiry into the validity of a tying arrangement must focus on the market or markets in
which the two products are sold . . . .”).
106. The per se rule against price fixing seems to have been established at least by
1927. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). In United States
v. Topco Associates, Justice Marshall cites Judge Taft’s 1899 decision in Addyston
Pipe, among other cases, for the proposition that horizontal territorial allocations are
per se offenses. 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). However, the concept of per se illegality in
antitrust law did not crystallize until significantly later. Indeed, contrary to Justice
Marshall’s view, Justice Burger actually dissented in Topco on the ground that the
Court was creating a new per se rule.
107. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007).
108. See supra note 101.
109. See supra note 101.
110. Piraino, supra note 33, at 1757.
111. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 612-13.
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legislation.”112 The majority opinion in Topco also noted that there was
considerable debate about the wisdom of per se rules, although most of
the references were addressed to the application of per se prohibitions to
vertical restraints – which the Court later abandoned.113
II. AN ANALYTICAL CRITIQUE OF THE RULE OF REASON
A. BOARD OF TRADE AND ITS CRITICS
The Board of Trade opinion and its rule of reason have been the
target of a steady stream of scholarly criticism from all political
perspectives. Indeed, it is hard to find a kind word about Justice
Brandeis’ rule of reason. Robert Bork, whose Antitrust Paradox helped
usher in the current restrained view of antitrust, argued that Brandeis
had fashioned a “deviant” rule of reason.114 His primary objection was
that the open-endedness of Brandeis’ rule allowed courts to condemn
conduct on the basis of any number of factors that, in his view, had no
connection with the narrow economic efficiency objective of antitrust.115
Bork argued that Brandeis was animated by a view of antitrust that not
only protected consumers from private restraints, but also protected
smaller and less efficient rivals.116 Thus, Bork analyzed the famous
passage from Board of Trade as distinguishing “regulation” of trade
from its “suppression” as reflecting an antitrust philosophy that
permitted private restraints that protected the small and weak from the
dominant.117 “A strong underlying policy orientation for Brandeis’ rule
seems to have been sympathy for small, perhaps inefficient, traders who
might go under in fully competitive markets.118 His rule thus spoke for
the tempering of competition by private agreement.”119 Thus one
longstanding objection to Board of Trade has been that it reinforces the
power of individual judges to impose their own philosophies on
competitive markets.120
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 609, n.10.
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 817 (1965).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 815.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Judge Taft’s objection to at least one version of a rule of reason is
perhaps echoed in Bork’s later critique of Board of Trade. In Addyston
Pipe, Judge Taft rejected arguments that sought to invoke English case
law for the proposition that some naked restraints on competition were
permissible.121 In fashioning his ancillary restraints doctrine, Judge Taft
rejected these arguments on the ground that judges should not be
deciding how much competition is a good thing.122
It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mistaking, as
we conceive, the proper limits of the relaxation of the rules for
determining the unreasonableness of restraints of trade, have set sail
on a sea of doubt, and have assumed the power to say, in respect to
contracts which have no other purpose and no other consideration on
either side than the mutual restraint of the parties, how much
restraint of competition is in the public interest, and how much is
not. The manifest danger in the administration of justice according to
so shifting, vague, and indeterminate a standard would seem to be a
123
strong reason against adopting it.

Others have expressed concerns about administrability of a rule that
sets almost no meaningful boundaries around what antitrust courts can
consider.124 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp observed in his indictment of
the rule: “Brandeis’ statement of the rule of reason . . . has been one of
the most damaging in the annals of antitrust” as it “has suggested to
many courts that . . . nearly everything is relevant.”125 Richard Posner
has similarly argued that Board of Trade fails to provide meaningful
guidance, and thus can be interpreted to prohibit conduct that is efficient
on balance.126 Referring to Brandeis’ formulation of the rule of reason,
Posner observes: “This is not a helpful formulation. To be told to look to
the history, circumstances, purposes and effects of a challenged
restriction is not to be provided with usable criteria of illegality.”127
Most recently, Professor Maurice Stucke presented a thoughtful
analysis of the rule of reason and concluded that it does not even
121.
122.
123.
124.

United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1898).
Id. at 283-84, 293.
Id.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 255 (3d ed. 2005).
125. Id.
126. Richard Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections
on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 (1977).
127. Id.
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comport with internationally-recognized rule of law standards.128 A
primary concern in this regard is vagueness.129 Even prior to Board of
Trade, the rule of reason announced in Standard Oil had precipitated a
policy battle between those who argued for clearer rules and those,
including Justice White, who believed the legal standard should allow
courts discretion to permit certain private arrangements.130 Board of
Trade, Stucke argues, set back President Wilson’s legislative efforts to
bring clarity to antitrust law through the enactments of the Clayton Act
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.131 “Even if another court found
a similar practice in a different industry anticompetitive, [Board of
Trade’s] rule-of-reason factors would treat each challenged restraint as
novel. Liability would turn on facts peculiar to the industry to which,
and during the period when, the defendant applied the restraint.”132
Years later, after the rule of reason came to predominate in antitrust law,
little has been achieved to give it clarity.133 Stucke posed the question:
“So how does the rule of reason, the Court’s ‘prevailing,’ ‘usual’ and
‘accepted standard’ for evaluating conduct under the Sherman Act, fare
under these ruleof-law principles? Poorly.”134 Specifically, he points out
that those who are subject to the law cannot effectively plan their affairs
to conform to the demands of the coercive power of government; and
that the rule is so obscure as to allow the power of government to be
exercised arbitrarily.135 That there is a plausible argument that a rule of
this vintage is so devoid of predictable content as to violate ruleoflaw
precepts is a rather stunning indictment, (although Stucke goes on to
argue only for rather modest improvements at the margins of rule of
reason doctrine).136
Others have described the Board of Trade standard as “hardly
illuminating,”137 and as having “‘legitimiz[ed] the ‘big case’ in

128. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1489 (2009).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See generally, Stucke, supra note 128.
132. Id. at 1398.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1421.
135. Id. at 1466.
136. Id. at 1488-89.
137. Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago
Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the “Rule of Reason” in Restraint of Trade
Analysis, 15 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1992).
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antitrust.”138 It would be a challenge to find a legal standard that has
endured as long as Board of Trade’s rule of reason against so much
scholarly objection from so many different points of view. A full
catalogue of Board of Trade’s detractors would be difficult to assemble.
The reader is invited to locate commentary championing the Brandeis
standard. It works for no one.
B. A CRITIQUE OF CAL. DENTAL
The Cal. Dental decision ought to have drawn at least as much
scholarly criticism as Board of Trade. It drains rule of reason analysis of
content, aggravates the already excessive costs of antitrust litigation and
compliance, relies on the improbable force of stare decisis for future
clarification of its empty standard, and bizarrely disregards established
law and policy against defending restraints on the ground that
competition does not work in a particular industrial context.
1. Cal. Dental’s “Competition Doesn’t Work” Analysis
A troubling aspect of the analysis in Cal. Dental is that the Court
strained to accept an argument that flies in the face of sound policy and
previously unyielding precedent. The defense in Cal. Dental was that
unfettered price competition by dentists, given the peculiarities of their
business, would not work to consumers’ benefit and might actually harm
them.139 The Court indulged this defense at length, ultimately agreeing
with the dentists that price competition in their industry might not
work.140 Noting the asymmetry of information between consumers and
suppliers in the market for dental services, and leaning heavily on the
“professional context,” the Court concluded that a horizontal agreement
to restrict price advertising might, in the mind of the conspirators (i.e.,
the California Dental Association), spur consumers to consume more
rather than fewer dental services.141 Justice Souter reasoned that the
Association’s self-imposed prohibition of discount advertising “appears
to reflect the prediction that any costs to competition associated with the
elimination of across-the-board advertising will be outweighed by gains

138.
139.
140.
141.

ABA Antitrust Sec., Monograph No. 23, The Rule of Reason 5 (1999).
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-73 (1999).
Id. at 774-75.
Id. at 772-73, 774-75.
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to consumer information (and hence competition) created by discount
advertising that is exact, accurate, and more easily verifiable (at least by
regulators).”142 Thus, at least the conspirators’ purpose might have been
a benign one (although there was no evidence to that effect), but many
industries honestly believe competition for them is rueful.143 Proof that
competition is a bad idea for this or that particular industry has never
been admissible in antitrust cases.144 Still, Justice Souter chastised the
Ninth circuit for ignoring “the possibility that the particular restrictions
on professional advertising could have different effects from those
‘normally’ found in the commercial world . . .”145 thus accepting the
possibility that dentistry is an industry where price competition does not
work.
This is precisely the defense based on a frontal assault on
competition itself which the case law has roundly and soundly rejected.
Society of Professional Engineers involved a similar, and more
compelling defense.146 That case involved a challenge to a professional
society’s ethical rule “prohibiting the submission of any form of price
information to a prospective customer which would enable that
customer to make a price comparison on engineering services.”147 Civil
engineers’ “study, design, and construction of all types of improvements
to real property—bridges, office buildings, airports, and factories are
examples.”148 In defense of that price advertising ban, it was argued that
public safety was imperiled by free and unfettered price competition;
i.e., that “competition among professional engineers was contrary to the
public interest.”149 Civil engineers, if allowed to compete on price, might
submit low-ball bids to obtain contracts and then be forced to oversee
public works projects that were inadequately budgeted.150 There
defendants mounted a nearly identical argument to that of the California
Dental Association: that price competition in that particular industry
would not work because competition would lead to unethical deceptive
practices and because “engineering projects may be inherently imprecise
and incapable of taking into account all the variables which will be
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 775.
Id. at 775-76.
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694 (1978).
Id. Cal. Dental,, 526 U.S. at 773.
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 683.
Id.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 684-85.
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involved in the actual performance of the project.”151 Justice Stevens’
opinion laid bare that defense: “The early cases also foreclose the
argument that because of the special characteristics of a particular
industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and
commerce than competition.”152 The Society’s defense “on the basis of
the potential threat that competition poses to the public safety and the
ethics of its profession is nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic
policy of the Sherman Act.”153 In other words, “competition does not
work” is not a defense. This same defense was rejected again
unambiguously in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.154 There, a
dentists’ professional association argued that quality of care would be
compromised if dentists were free to compete as to what information
they would supply to payment plans in support of authorization
requests.155 Again, the Court said: “The argument is, in essence, that an
unrestrained market in which consumers are given access to the
information they believe to be relevant to their choices will lead them to
make unwise and even dangerous choices. Such an argument amounts to
‘nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman
Act.’”156 These “competition does not work” arguments are
indistinguishable from the one the Court accepted in Cal. Dental.
If dentistry cannot be practiced ethically in a competitive
marketplace, an industry antitrust exemption could be sought from
Congress;157 it was inappropriate for the Court to overrule the Sherman
Act itself as applied to a particular industry practice. The Court has done
so only once, for professional baseball, with questionable wisdom, and
Congress eventually reacted to undo much of the damage.158 With the
exception of professional baseball, whose antitrust exemption traces

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 693.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 695.
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986).
Id.
Id.
Industry-specific statutory exemptions from federal antitrust law include the
Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (2006) (agricultural cooperatives); the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (insurance); and the Newspaper
Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1801, among others.
158. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (upholding the industry-specific antitrust
exemption for professional baseball). But see 15 U.S.C. § 26b (imposing statutory limits
on the baseball exemption to extend antitrust law to restreaints on player contracts).
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back to an earlier era of commerce clause doctrine coupled with
perceived congressional acquiescence over time, no industry has ever
been singled out by the Court for specialized antitrust immunity.159 As
Justice Stevens pointed out in Professional Engineers, “this Court has
never accepted such an argument.”160
Moreover, by opening the door to industry-specific arguments
against the desirability of price competition, the Court opened a
Pandora’s box, further contributing to the uncertainty and
unpredictability of the rule of reason.161 If dentistry is an industry not fit
for price competition, what about the practice of law (where there is
asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers coupled with the
complexity of services that dwarfs anything in dentistry); or funeral
services; health care generally; and so on? One sound reason for the
holding in Professional Engineers is that the courts are ill-suited to
become public utility commissions deciding the proper organization of
every industry in the American and global economies.162 Cal. Dental
took an ill-advised step toward remaking antitrust rules on an industryspecific basis, and indeed forging exemptions in response to industry
complaints that competition is a bad idea for them.163
2. Expanded Litigation Burdens and Social Costs
By demanding “an enquiry meet for the case,” Cal. Dental reflects
the court’s continuing trend toward imposing ever greater burdens on
antitrust plaintiffs in the interest of avoiding “false positives” so that
159. Non-statutory antitrust exemptions have been recognized by the courts for
certain categories of conduct, but, aside from professional baseball, not for specific
industries. Compare Keogh v. Chi. & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922) (generally
exempting filed tariff rates from antitrust treble damages claims, without regard to any
specific inductry), with Flood, 407 U.S. 258 (reaffirming special industry antitrust
exemption for major league baseball); 15 U.S.C § 26b (limiting and codifying a special
industry exemption for baseball).
160. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694 (1978).
161. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-73 (1999).
162. 435 U.S. at 695-96 (“Exceptions to the Sherman Act for potentially dangerous
goods and services would be tantamount to a repeal of the statute. In our complex
economy, the number of items that may cause serious harm is almost endless—
automobiles, drugs, foods, aircraft components, heavy equipment, and countless others,
cause serious harm to individuals or to the public at large if defectively made. The
judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public against this harm by conferring monopoly
privileges on the manufacturers.”).
163. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 773.
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case outcomes can better align with the economic objectives of
antitrust.164 The per se rules and abbreviated “look” rules can
theoretically yield the wrong result in particular cases, possibly
discouraging or penalizing procompetitive conduct –- although the
extent to which per se rules have ever actually discouraged desirable
conduct is a matter of pure speculation.165 By expanding the contexts in
which antitrust defendants may advance evidence of economic
efficiency justifications, the Court invites a potentially extensive
economics-based inquiry to test whether a particular restraint, in its
market context, might on balance benefit consumers.166 This is why the
Court has abandoned per se rules that previously condemned vertical
price fixing and vertical territorial restraints.167 As the Court noted in
overturning the per se rule against maximum resale price fixing, “we
have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to ‘restraints
imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic
impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.’” 168
However, there are considerable economic costs that result from the
shift from categorical per se rules to a more elaborate and less definite
rule of reason analysis.169 This is especially true because Cal. Dental
abandoned any clear categorical approach and opened wide the rule of
reason to an infinite range of standards.170 Business planning, public and
private enforcement and judicial decisions all have become more
complex and costly.171
Cal. Dental’s negative impact on antitrust compliance cannot be
overstated. It is a truism that antitrust compliance efforts benefit
164.
165.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007).
Purely theoretical attempts have been made purporting to evaluate the extent of
the “false positive” problem. See Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly,
and the Expected Cost of False Positive Errors, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1
(2010). However, there is no empirical evidence to support the proposition that antitrust
plaintiffs in particular have won many more favorable settlements and verdicts than
they should have.
166. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 774-75.
167. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007);
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36
(1977).
168. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 3 (citing and quoting from FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986).
169. See generally Posner, supra note 126.
170. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780-81.
171. See generally Posner, supra note 126.
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consumers at considerably less social cost than antitrust litigation – a
stitch in time saves nine. Businesses attempting to conform their conduct
to the law need to know what the rules are – in advance. Risk-averse
companies tend to avoid conduct if legal counsel cannot assure its
lawfulness. Antitrust rules that are unclear, unpredictable and uncertain
thus tend to to discourage desirable conduct as well as undesirable
conduct. A risk-averse and well-counseled company, having no basis for
predicting how much or what sort of analysis a court might someday
apply to evaluate the lawfulness of its conduct, will tend to steer clear of
conduct that has anticompetitive elements but which a court might or
might not find to produce net competitive benefits.172 Under the
uncertainty created by Cal. Dental, predicting the outcome of an
antitrust case that might be filed at some the future point would often
require advance knowledge of such things as the relevant market
definition that a court would ultimately accept for the case.173 Corporate
legal counsel cannot engage in detailed relevant market analysis ex ante,
at least not the way litigants do in litigation with the aid of economics
expertise and at an enormous expense.174 Viewed from an economics
perspective, the cost of making accurate predictions about conduct that
is lawful but close to the line of legality – conduct that should not be
discouraged – exceeds the expected returns.175
Consequently, the “false positives” that the Supreme Court has so
assiduously sought to prevent have to some degree merely shifted from
the court room to the board room. The very leniency of modern antitrust
law is buried in the obscurity and unpredictability of a rule of reason.
Perversely, only the less risk averse firms will fail to be deterred from
beneficial conduct, the very firms that will feel equally at liberty to
indulge in harmful conduct.176
Antitrust enforcement is also hampered by Cal. Dental’s openendedness. Enforcement agencies and private plaintiffs need to know
what is permitted and what is not, which cases to pursue and which ones
not to. Evaluating a particular enforcement initiative should not be a
matter of guesswork. Just as vague rules discourage desirable business
172. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984).
173. Jonathan Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 129 (2007).
174. Id.
175. See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (Dec. 1972).
176. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 173.
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conduct, uncertainty likewise begets agency reluctance to bring
desirable cases.177
Of course, vague antitrust rules impose significant burdens on the
courts.178 Courts expend considerable amounts of scarce resources on
rule of reason antitrust litigation.179 As the Supreme Court noted in
Superior Court Trial Lawyers, among other cases: “The administrative
efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are unusually compelling. The
per se rules avoid ‘the necessity for an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable.’”180 True, a court
can apply a truncated rule of reason if it finds it appropriate and thus
avoid some of the protracted litigation.181 However, Cal. Dental and
cases in its wake have done very little to explain the circumstances that
should trigger abbreviated analyses, nor have these cases defined the
extent of appropriate abbreviation.182 It is not unusual for trial courts to
find their “incredibly complicated and prolonged” antitrust trial results
reversed on appeal precisely because the trial engaged in too much or
too little rule of reason evaluation of defendants’ conduct.183 Cal. Dental
is a good example.
Cal. Dental’s case-by-case approach thus relegates Section 1
analysis to the very “shifting, vague and indeterminate” standard that
Judge Taft cautioned against more than 100 years ago.184 The decision
trumpets case-specific, individually-tailored, review to help ensure
correct outcomes in particular cases at the expense of efficiency,
predictability and uniformity in the administration of antitrust law.185
Trial courts are directed not to fall prey to regarding rule of reason
177. Celesta A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291, 295-96 (1987).
178. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990).
179. Id. at 419, n.7.
180. Id. at 430 (citing and quoting N. Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958)).
181. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
182. Indeed, Cal. Dental precludes formulaic categorization of cases, instead
requiring in each instance a specialized, case-specific “enquiry meet for the case.” Cal.
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81(1999).
183. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 430.
184. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
185. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780-81.
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analysis as a “spectrum” of adequate reasonableness analysis, but at the
same time admonished to find the right degree of reasonable analysis
among the infinite possibilities.186 Although there rather obviously is a
spectrum of adequate analyses, the Court’s warning about the term
“spectrum” as a metaphor is that the term “spectrum,” borrowed as it is
from the scientific terminology of optics, suggests too much clarity,
thereby deceptively suggesting “more precision than we can hope for.”
All hope of precision is abandoned.
3. The Empty Promise of Stare Decisis
The Court seemed to acknowledge the need for transparency in the
law, but resorted to a peculiar and unlikely mechanism to achieve even a
small measure of it. Citing Professor Areeda, the Court acknowledged
the “necessity, particularly great in the quasi-common law realm of
antitrust, that courts explain the logic of their conclusions. By exposing
their reasoning, judges . . . are subjected to others’ critical analyses,
which in turn can lead to better understanding for the future.”187 To
achieve an increasingly predictable standard, Justice Souter thought that
transparency in judicial decisions would create a body of case law that
would eliminate ambiguity and doubt over time.188 Justice Souter’s
vision is for a future in which the accumulated experience of courts will
eventually bring order as similar cases beget similar results after
receiving similar levels of review.189 The emergence of a body of wellreasoned and fully-articulated decisional law is anticipated to make
antitrust decision making easier over time.190 “The object is to see
whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily
will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a
restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of
a more sedulous one. And of course what we see may vary over time, if
rule of reason analyses in case after case reach identical conclusions.”191
This seems fanciful at best. The rule of reason is now 100 years old
and the promise of clarification through judicial application has proven
to be empty.192 The rule’s purported standard is devoid of substantive
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 780.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Stucke, supra note 128, at 1466.
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content that could guide judges to apply it consistently so that patterns
could emerge.193 Not only has the Court failed to give content to this
legal standard, but it has indulged in shifting the standard around in
response to the economic theory du jour.194 Consider Cal. Dental: The
Sherman Act was already more than 100 years old when the Court made
a major adjustment to the application of the rule of reason.195
In fact, stare decisis has not been a particularly strong force of
stability in any aspect of antitrust jurisprudence.196 The most unsettled
period of antitrust law has been within the past three decades, which
have brought outright reversals of at least three longstanding antitrust
rules,197 and a sea of change in the policy underpinnings that the Court
attributes to the statute.198 Time-honored conceptions about predatory
pricing have been relegated to history,199 per se rules of equally
impressive vintage have been overruled,200 case law precedents from the
heyday of merger enforcement have been roundly repudiated,201 and
even the procedural rules for testing antirust complaints have been
upended.202
Even if antitrust rules had more staying power, experience has
shown that “similar” cases do not exist when every aspect of context is
allowed to be taken into account, so that the promise that similar cases
will yield a coherent body of law is unattainable.203 The vast universe of
economic activity takes place in infinitely varying market contexts that
may arguably have different likely effects in different markets at
different times. For example, a fully and transparently explained judicial
condemnation of an agreement among cast iron pipe producers
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 44, at 16-19.
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
See supra note 6.
Id.
See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ch. 2.
Brooke Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 U.S. 209

(1993).
200. See cases cited supra note 6.
201. See generally, R.H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von’s Grocery to
Consumer Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (2001).
202. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573 (2007).
203. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979). In Broadcast
Music, the court acknowledged that defendants had engaged in conduct that was
“literally” price fixing, but found that the context required application of an analysis
that was deeper and more nuanced than price-fixing cases normally involve.
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representing 40% of their relevant markets in 2010 to refuse to produce
products responsive to an amendment in the applicable safety code will
shed no light on an agreement among 18% of aluminum can producers
to do the “same thing” in 2020, let alone an agreement among patent
licensors in the pharmaceutical market for certain blood pressure
medications to do the “same thing” in 2050. In fact, it is not clear that
any two conspiracies really “do the same thing” if all aspects of their
respective contexts are weighed into the mix.
Cal. Dental itself is a case in point. There the Court managed to
find reason to expect procompetitive net effects from a horizontal
agreement among dentists to suppress advertising of discounts, thus
requiring a “more sedulous” look than the true “quick look” analysis
that had been applied by the Ninth Circuit.204 Prior to Cal. Dental, it
seemed clear beyond dispute that an agreement among rival
professionals to refrain from price competition by suppressing price
information was subject to summary condemnation under a “quick look”
analysis;205 and that an agreement among professionals that went further
to coordinate price terms was per se unlawful.206 Yet a bare majority on
the Court found the dentist’s agreement not to advertise such things as
across-the-board discounts required more analysis.207 This is indicative
of the problem. Cases cannot establish rules if they are all
distinguishable on their facts.
Certainly, since Cal. Dental there has been no discernible trend in
antitrust decisions that gives life to Justice Souter’s notion that an
infinitely variable rule of reason would eventually settle into predictable
pockets as similar cases begat similar analyses and results.208
4. Aggravation of the Board of Trade Relevancy Problems
Another problem with Cal. Dental is that it managed to further
obscure a rule that was already so inclusive of relevant factors as to
exclude almost nothing from consideration. Board of Trade instructs that
the relevant evidence in a rule of reason case includes the history of the
industry, its condition before the restraint was imposed and afterwards,
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-71, 779-81 (1999).
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 779-81.
Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1179-80, 1182-84 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that none of the pre-existing categories of analysis could apply, and
creating a new “quick-look-plus-per-se-minus” analysis).
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facts that are peculiar to the business that might set the restraint on a
different footing than in some other industry or business, the nature of
the restraint, the purposes behind the imposition of the restraint
including the problems it was intended to solve.209 All of this opens
nearly everything to relevance. As one observer stated: “Justice
Brandeis’ statement of the rule of reason in Chicago Board of Trade . . .
has been one of the most damaging in the annals of antitrust. The
statement has suggested to many lower courts that, if the analysis is
under the rule of reason, then nearly everything is relevant.”210
5. Impairment of Settlements
Settlement is more difficult under uncertainty about what “enquiry
is meet for the case.” The substantive law of antitrust should facilitate
reasonable settlements because they avoid the high costs of litigation,
through trial and appeal, while vindicating the objectives of antitrust
law. Most antitrust cases settle, 211 but that does not mean that they settle
early, or that the terms of settlement are reasonable. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has expressed frustration that the huge exposures
defendants face in antitrust cases can force them to pay extortionate
amounts to settle weak cases just to keep them from heading into the
unpredictable waters of a jury trial.212
However, what the Supreme Court has not addressed are the
reasons why defendants might regard those waters as riddled with reefs
and shoals.213 The unpredictability of antitrust litigation under the rule of
reason is at least a contributor to this phenomenon.214 In rule of reason
cases counsel for each side have only a relatively weak basis for
predicting how elaborate and costly the litigation will be and what
outcome is most likely – both of which are much clearer in per se cases.
Although plaintiffs may only rarely win rule of reason cases, that is cold
209.
210.
211.

246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 225.
Edward D. Cavanaugh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 813 (1987) (citing Georgetown study of 2500 civil
antitrust cases finding that 88.2% settled before trial).
212. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
213. The Supreme Court has also failed to allude to any empirical evidence for the
assertion that extortionate settlements are a problem in antitrust cases, or that they are
more particularly so in antitrust litigation than in other areas of the law.
214. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1422-23.
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comfort to a defendant faced with a small but unpredictable risk of
enormous liability exposure. So the defendant-friendly rule of reason is
in tension with one of its very objectives, leaving defendants with
unpredictable outcomes and large exposures and thus actually promoting
so-called extortionate settlements and prolonging litigation.
6. Anti-Plaintiff Bias
Plaintiffs necessarily bear the burden of proof of their case at trial.
In the absence of a settlement, the variable rule of reason goes on to
create problems for the plaintiff’s presentation of its case: How much
“enquiry is meet?”215 A plaintiff cannot with assurance know what to
allege or when to rest, since the amount of evidence that it must present
in order to prove the contours of the relevant market, the defendants’
market power, etc., are unknowable. Cal. Dental sets a trap for the
unwary, and more or less assures unwitting mistakes. The Court’s bias
against private plaintiffs has barely been concealed, exposed by such
references as “extortionate” settlements and the like. Even if one
accepted the Court’s apparently dim view of private antitrust plaintiffs,
the rule of reason applies equally to governmental enforcement.
For example, the FTC lost the Cal. Dental case because it failed to
prove enough about the relevant market, instead relying on the court to
take a “quick look” approach since the challenged conduct involved an
agreement not to advertise discounts.216 Agreements by rivals not to
compete via discount advertising seems like a familiar enough context,
but the Supreme Court speculated that consumers might consume more
dental services with such a restraint in place and on that basis required
more proof than the FTC had presented.217 Yet the Court left no sign
posts that could guide future litigants.
The elephant in the room is the fact that plaintiffs rarely pursue,
and even more rarely win, rule of reason cases.218 As Posner pointed out
215.
216.
217.
218.

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
Id. at 769-71.
Id. at 776-78.
“The empirical evidence reflects that most rule-of-reason claims never reach
juries; rather, most are decided on motions to dismiss or summary judgment, and most
(and in some surveys nearly all) antitrust plaintiffs lose. For example, in one recent
survey of judicial resolutions of private section 2 Sherman Act claims, all of which are
governed by the rule of reason, defendants prevailed ninety-seven percent of the time
(335 of the 344 cases). Nearly all of the defendants’ wins (313) came on motions to
dismiss or summary judgment.” Stucke, supra note 10, at 1423-24.
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“[t]he content of the rule of reason is largely unknown; in practice it is
little more than a euphemism for nonliablity.”219 Similarly, Lemley and
Leslie observe that the “conventional wisdom is that vertical restraints
evaluated under the rule of reason are essentially de facto per se legal
since rule of reason cases are notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to
win.”220 The Court’s shift away from per se rules toward an open-ended
rule of reason is consistent with its broader pro-business agenda.221 The
Court’s unconcealed view is that Type I errors are generally to be
preferred over Type II;222 meaning that it is preferable to give a violator
a pass than to condemn possible innocence. The rule of reason, as
applied in this policy context, is generally a loss for plaintiffs, at least
insofar as the rule of reason is a “little more than a euphemism for
nonliablity.”223
A scant few cases like Polygram224 and North Texas Specialty
Physicians225 stand as notable exceptions, but these were cases brought
by a public enforcement agency and represent stand-out exceptions to
Posner’s observation that rule of reason equates generally to
nonliability. Plaintiffs faced with this burden are likely to forego
litigation because they “simply cannot afford” the investment in rule of
reason cases.226 The litigation burden of defining relevant markets,
establishing market power and proving anticompetitive marketplace
effects exceeds the abilities and finances of many litigants.227 The
219.
220.
221.

Posner, supra note 127, at 14.
Lemley & Leslie, supra note 19, at 1260-1261.
Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19roberts.html?pagewanted=all
.
222. Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75
(2010).
223. See Posner, supra note 126.
224. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
225. N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
226. Denny’s Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 1994).
227. William Kolasky has argued that Cal. Dental is “under-appreciated” and
(rather optimistically) that the rule of reason works well for plaintiffs, citing the FTC’s
victory in Polygram Holdings, Inc., 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See William
Kolasky, Reinvigorating Antitrust Enforcement in the United States: A Proposal, 22
ANTITRUST 85, 85, 87 (2008). While Kolasky lays out an interesting model for applying
the rule of reason, he neither cites any other rule-of-reason plaintiff victories, nor
describes the rule of reason model that courts actually use. Indeed, by his own account,
the court in Polygram came to the correct conclusion via wrong analytical avenue. Id. at
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Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that a rule of reason inquiry in
litigation imposes “the necessity for an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable.”228
7. An Analytical Critique of the Rule of Reason – Gaps and
Inconsistencies
It should therefore not be surprising that the case law applying the
rule of reason and its more abbreviated variants has not only failed to
live up to its promise of a transparent body of decisional law, but has
instead left wide-open gaps on a number of central issues. A full century
after the rule of reason was first announced, courts, scholars and
enforcement agencies continue to offer divergent articulations of some
of the most fundamental rule of reason issues.
First, it is not even clear when the rule of reason fully applies.
Following Cal. Dental, it is no longer helpful to say that the rule of
reason is the default,229 because there is no longer a clear delineation
between that rule and per se illegality. All that is certain when a per se
rule is not applicable is that some level of analysis is then required – but
how much? And more importantly, in what cases must a truly full-blown
case be made? Second, it is unclear whether, and at what stage of the
case, a plaintiff is required to establish market power. Finally, there is no
definitive distinction drawn in case law between actual and merely
theoretical and conjectural effects. It is thus uncertain whether and when
a party is put to the burden of proving actual effects rather than
theorizing them without evidence of actual marketplace impact.
These represent enormous shortcomings. The decision to subject a
plaintiff’s case to anything like a full-blown rule of reason analysis can
have decisive implications for many antitrust cases, as does the
imposition of a burden to establish the defendants’ collective market
power.230 Conversely, if a defendant must defend by establishing that
88. In any event, the list of plaintiff successes in rule of reason cases under Cal. Dental
is quite short.
228. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990) (quoting
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
229. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007)
(“The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains
trade in violation of § 1.”).
230. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1425-26.
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actual procompetitive virtues of offsetting value have benefitted
consumers, that is a very different burden than merely presenting a
theoretical case that the conduct under challenge might have a plausible
tendency to foster efficiencies and consumer benefits.231
These gaps cannot be blamed on Cal. Dental, but instead combined
with the open-endedness of the Cal. Dental rule of reason to lend
intolerable opacity and unpredictability to antitrust law. No one disputes
the enormous difference in cost and complexity between a per se or
even quick-look case and a more full-blown rule of reason case.232 Nor
ought it be argued that antitrust analysis should be structured to deter the
very private enforcement that Section 4 of the Clayton Act was
specifically tailored to encourage via the mechanism of trebling
damages.233 Yet a litigant or court heading into a case that does not
involve hard-core cartel activity often has no way of predicting the
course the case might take, how complex or costly the case will be, nor
the likelihood of success.234 It is self-evident that this state of the law
inherently discourages private filings. The current doctrine governing
the evaluation of restraints is thus not only unruly, but contrary to the
clear intent of the law.
C. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES DOES THE
FULL-BLOWN RULE OF REASON APPLY?
Perhaps the most basic issue that lacks a consistent and
comprehensive approach is the determination of what sorts of cases
merit fulsome rule of reason analysis and what sorts of cases merit
something more cursory. The introduction of Cal. Dental’s sliding scale,
with its obliteration of categorical analysis, makes this even more

231. In offering proof to refute the alleged anticompetitive effect of an agreement,
defendants may not rely on evidence of procompetitive justifications that are found to
be pretextual. See, e.g., N. Cent. Watt Count, Inc. v. Watt Count Eng’g Sys., Inc., 678
F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); see also Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding jury instruction that required
consideration of whether defendant’s procompetitive business justifications were
pretextual).
232. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990).
233. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATUTES 167, Vol. I ( Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978).
234. Edward D. Cavanagh, Attorneys’ Fees in Antitrust Litigation: Making the
System Fairer, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 51, 60 (1988).
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obscure, because the question is no longer simply “Rule of reason or per
se?” but rather “Rule of reason, per se or something else?” Where along
this infinite continuum does a case belong? This question has vexed the
courts, leading them in a variety of directions.
Recently, for example, the Ninth Circuit articulated a standard of
review that it dubbed “a per se-plus-or- quick-look-minus” analysis,
“somewhere between pure per se and pure quick look.”235 In California
v. Safeway, the Ninth Circuit wrestled at length with deciding whether
an agreement by supermarkets to pool profits was illegal per se or
should instead be subjected to more penetrating inquiry.236 Forty years
ago the Supreme Court stated without qualification that “[p]ooling of
profits pursuant to an inflexible ratio . . . runs afoul of the Sherman
Act,” deeming the practice unlawful without elaboration.237 Every case
to ever consider the matter had likewise condemned naked profit sharing
arrangements among horizontal rivals.238 The Ninth Circuit
distinguished the earlier cases on various grounds, including whether the
defendants had market power and whether their arrangement was an
enduring one or one of short duration.239 However, resort to these
distinctions found no support in the controlling precedents.240 A shortlived per se violation is no less a per se violation because the
irrebuttable presumption of harm has never been limited to restraints of
any particular duration.241 Moreover, the only purpose of the profitsharing arrangement in Safeway was to avoid competition during labor
strife.242 The point was to block the labor union’s divide-and-conquer
strategy by preventing any of the supermarkets from taking competitive
advantage if one of its rivals was struck, and it was not.243 It is
impossible to find any consumer benefit that could flow from such a
temporary hiatus from price competition.
235. Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010),
vacated, 633 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2011), superseded by sub nom. Cal. ex rel. Harris, 651
F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011).
236. Id.
237. Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 135 (1969).
238. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 149 (1948) (profit
sharing agreement a “bald effort to substitute monopoly for competition”); N. Sec. Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Chi., M & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P.
Ry. Co., 61 F. 993 (8th Cir. 1894); Anderson v. Jett, 12 S.W. 670 (Ky. 1889).
239. Brown, 615 F.3d at 1177-80.
240. Id. at 1179.
241. Id.at 1185-89.
242. Id. at 1176.
243. Id. at 1175-76.
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The Ninth Circuit’s drive to create another obscure label for
gauging analytical depth under the circumstances of the Safeway case
points to the problem. There is no real measure anymore. There are no
categories with any substance. The problem with the infinite possibilities
posited by Cal. Dental is that there is no agreement in any corner about
how to decide what standard applies in a given case. “An enquiry meet
for the case” is not a legal standard — it merely begs one.
Thus after 100 years, we are not simply litigating whether a
particular case falls under per se rules or the rule of reason, but more
fundamentally what sorts of cases should be condemned only after a
full-blown inquiry, what sorts only after a quick but more “sedulous”
inquiry, what sorts after just a very brief look and what sorts after no
look at all once the conspiracy itself is established. Seemingly familiar
categories of restraints, including conspiracies to prevent price and
discount advertising (in Cal. Dental), profit pooling by rivals (in
Safeway), to refrain from price competition (in PolyGram) and others
are now open to an expansive array of issues that at one time would
have been thought to be foreclosed. Categories of conduct with
predictable anticompetitive effects have been blurred, creating the
expansive role for indeterminate rule of reason analysis.
1. Full-Blown Rule of Reason in Supreme Court Cases
One reason, among others, that the rule of reason remains so
obscure is that the Supreme Court has declined to articulate affirmative
criteria for its full-blown application. Instead, it has relied on treating
full-blown rule of reason as the default analysis to be applied unless the
case presents certain attributes that eliminate or reduce the need to
inquire into competitive effects of the alleged restraint.244 Where certain
contextual traits surround the restraint, it is removed to some extent
from full-blown review. By extension, then, the absence of these traits
might require the application of a full-blown analysis.
It might be helpful if the categories of restraint that require truly
full-blown analysis could be identified. The per se categories of
horizontal price fixing, market allocations, and output limitations are
244. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively
applies rule of reason analysis, under which antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a
particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it
will be found unlawful.”).
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reasonably clear, even if the Court has obscured even these categories in
cases like BMI. If the ends of the Cal. Dental spectrum were clarified,
that would be an improvement.
However, a review of the traits that can be identified as triggering
full-blown rule of reason analysis leaves unclear whether these traits are
necessary or even sufficient for the removal of a matter from full-blown
analysis.
a. Facially Anticompetitive Naked Restraints
One trait that removes a case from full-blown rule of reason
analysis is where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have
an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”245 The decision to
apply the per se rule turns on “whether the practice facially appears to
be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output . . . or instead one designed to increase economic
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.”246 In
Cal. Dental, the court explained that a truncated or “quick look” rule of
reason analysis is appropriate in cases presenting restraints with obvious
anticompetitive potential. Thus the court referred to its prior cases in
which it had applied a truncated rule of reason analysis to condemn
certain types of conduct summarily. These included a dentists’ concerted
refusal to provide insurance companies with requested x-rays, which
was deemed “a horizontal agreement among the participating dentists to
withhold from their customers a particular service that they desire;”247 an
agreement among civil engineers to refuse to discuss price terms with
customers;248 and the NCAA’s restriction on the number of football
games for which member colleges could sell television rights.249
Thus, one might surmise that a full-blown rule of reason analysis
would be appropriate where an observer with a rudimentary
understanding of economics cannot conclude with confidence that the
conduct is anticompetitive.
This particular attribute has eluded consistent application because
in practice observers with more than just a “rudimentary” economics
245.
246.

Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
247. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
248. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
249. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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comprehension do not seem to agree. For example, in Cal. Dental itself,
the FTC, the Ninth Circuit, Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Stevens and
Ginsburg, and the majority opinion signatories all disagreed about
whether the agreement was facially invalid and on how much analysis
was required to draw a conclusion. Indeed, two of the FTC
Commissioners disagreed with the per se analysis of Chairman
Pitofsky’s opinion. The Commission (majority) regarded the agreement
as per se unlawful on the basis of an unbroken line of cases treating
agreements restricting price advertising as equivalent to price fixing.250
As Chairman Pitofsky observed: “This effective prohibition on truthful
and nondeceptive advertising of low fees and across-the-board discounts
constitutes a naked attempt to eliminate price competition and must be
judged unlawful per se.”251 The Ninth Circuit retreated from per se
analysis on the ground that the restraint was an ethical rule imposed by a
professional society.252 Given this context, coupled with the fact that a
naked restriction on price advertising was involved, the Ninth Circuit
concluded the “quick look” or truncated rule of reason analysis sufficed
to support the FTC’s ultimate condemnation of the rule. This approach
also found support, since Indiana Federation of Dentists similarly
involved a professional group’s imposition of a naked restraint thus
prompting quick-look review. A bare majority of the Supreme Court
found “quick” was too abbreviated and thus demanded further “more
sedulous” inquiry to determine whether the rule might have been
competitively justified. However, in so analyzing the problem, the
majority appears to have deviated from fundamental antitrust orthodoxy
that a restraint cannot be defended on the ground that competition is a
bad idea for a particular industry or business. The justification was that
if dentists were left freely to compete with price advertising, consumers
would be too unsophisticated to benefit and might on balance be harmed
by the practice. Thus unfettered competition might be harmful, and a
horizontal restraint to prevent the harm was sufficiently promising to
require more than a quick-look review. The dissenting justices disagreed
and found that the association’s rule could not pass muster even under a
rule of reason analysis.
Thus the Supreme Court’s reliance on “rudimentary” economics
understanding is misplaced. Without more guidance, this purported
250.
251.
252.

In re Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. 190, Docket No. 9259, op. (1996).
Id. at 79.
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997).
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standard fails to yield consistent, predictable outcomes in even the
familiar context of price-advertising restraints. This standard for
removing a case from full-blown rule of reason analysis is essentially
useless in practice.
b. Ancillary Restraints: The Absence of Economic
Integration Related to the Challenged Restraint
Another trait that has led the Supreme Court to remove a matter
from full-blown rule of reason review is the absence of some measure of
economic integration relating to the restraint. This is essentially the
ancillary restraints rule that derives from the common law, and was
made an enduring part of antitrust jurisprudence by Judge Taft in
Addyston Pipe.253
Despite its incomplete coverage, this doctrine is relatively clear and
useful in detaching certain collaborations from unduly harsh antitrust
scrutiny. While there are always going to be cases that are more difficult
than others to resolve, it is often clear whether a restraint is part of some
legitimate activity, and, if so, whether it is reasonably tailored to the
achievement of legitimate objectives.
Does the presence of some economic integration then yield a
meaningful and clear category of restraints that fall within the fullblown rule of reason? The ancillary restraints doctrine has no bearing on
how much analysis is required in order to balance the legitimate
objectives behind a restraint against its anticompetitive effects. Put
somewhat differently, this doctrine says nothing about where on the Cal.
Dental continuum to place a particular case. Rather, the doctrine merely
dislodges some cases from per se analysis.
c. Questionable Economic Self-Interest
Per se analysis has in certain cases been reserved for conspiratorial
conduct that is in the economic self-interest of the conspirators. This is
253. In its most recent discussion of this approach, the Court declined to apply the
doctrine to collaborative pricing by Shell Oil and Texaco in connection with the sale of
gasoline to service stations out of the joint ventures the two had formed. Texaco Inc. v.
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). The Court introduced the concept that “core activity” of a
legitimate collaboration is not subject to the ancillary restraint doctrine. In its brief
opinion, the Court offered no guidance for distinguishing core activity from non-core
activity. It also left some confusion about why the ancillary restraint doctrine did not
apply.
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not a rule that has found much useful application. In United States v.
Brown University,254 the Third Circuit applied a full rule of reason to an
agreement among universities setting common financial aid awards for
needy students. On its face, the restraint had attributes of price fixing,
since the universities were plainly competing for high-quality students
in the categories affected by the restraint, and fixing one dimension of
their competitive efforts. Agreement on how much to “pay” these
students (or discount their tuition) substantially limited the “price”
dimension of this competition.255 The Antitrust Division had thus
pursued the case as a per se violation akin to price fixing. The Third
Circuit declined to apply the per se rule, noting that unlike cases such as
National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States256 and FTC v.
Indiana Federation of Dentists,257 the universities had no economic selfinterest at stake.258 That is, in the absence of the agreement, each school
would have expended the same amount on financial assistance to
students. Thus, the agreement was unlike common price fixing, which
alters the competitors’ economic outcomes.259
The Supreme Court endorsed the “self-interested” restraint
distinction in Cal. Dental, citing Brown University.260 In a similar vein
are cases declining to apply per se rules in the context of professional
services markets. The court has adhered to the view that professions are
not entirely profit-driven, so that professional conduct should generally
not be condemned under per se rules. “The public service aspect, and
other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently.”261 Thus per se rules are
inapplicable where the economic incentives of the alleged conspirators
cannot be presumed to be self-interested, because the actors are

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 664.
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
476 U.S. 447 (1986).
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 672.
Id.
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (citing United States v.
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding full rule-of-reason analysis
required where “embodied a strong economic self-interest of the parties to them”)).
261. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89, n.17 (1975); see also Cal.
Dental, 526 U.S. at 773.

2012]

SAILING A SEA OF DOUBT

637

professionals imbued with a public interest, because the activity has
overtones of charity, or for some other reason.
This criterion only has narrow application and it also lacks certainty
or predictability because there are cases that are flatly inconsistent with
it or at least cast doubt on its universal applicability. The presumption in
Cal. Dental that professionals are not economically self-interested is
facially implausible, and runs counter to the application of per se rules
in Superior Court Trial Lawyers262 and Maricopa County Medical
Society.263 If doctors could be presumed to have less interest than
average in economic self-interest it would seem unnecessary for the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission to promulgate an
entire set of antitrust guidelines just for their industry.264 Self-interested
restraint of competition among professionals is hardly aberrational.
Additionally, even if the absence of economic self interest could
guide cases away from the per se rules, that still does not indicate where
on the continuum of rule of reason analysis to place a restraint.
Thus, none of these categories shed much light on whether, in the
context of a particular case, Cal. Dental would support a full-blown rule
of reason analysis. The criteria that can be extracted from precedent are
sparse, seem to apply inconsistently, and offer little predictive power.
The exception is the ancillary restraint doctrine, which has the virtues of
being fairly clear and predictable, but it lacks the virtue of resolving
very many cases that arise under Section 1.
After 100 years, it therefore remains the case that the courts have
provided no reasonably predictable framework for determining just
which cases are required to be evaluated fully under the rule of reason.
This ought to be regarded as a very important failing.265

262. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (condemning
as per se unlawful a concerted refusal to provide legal services for the express purpose
of increasing rates for those professional services).
263. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (Applying the per
se rule against price fixing to doctors).
264. U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm.’s Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement
Policy
in
Health
Care
(1996),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/policy/index.htm.
265. Stucke, supra note 128.
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2. Is Market Power an Essential Element of a Rule of Reason
Case?
Possibly the most important turn of events in a rule of reason case
is when the judge decides whether a plaintiff’s burden includes proof of
market power, yet the case law is inconsistent as to whether and when
proof of market power is a requisite element of a plaintiff’s antitrust
conspiracy case. 266 Also unclear are basic matters about what sort of
proof is required, how much market power is relevant and, indeed, the
meaning of the term itself. 267 These are critical issues because of the
cost, complexity and inherent tilt toward defendants that is implicit in
making market power an element of a plaintiff’s case.268
It is understandable why courts sometimes require plaintiffs to
establish defendants’ market power as an element of their case, since
antitrust is fundamentally concerned with the power of market
participants to distort markets and misallocate resources. If the
defendants lack the economic power to bring about anticompetitive
results, a private damages case is a waste of the parties’ and the public’s
resources, regardless of the conduct involved.269 There is no question
that market power is in many cases a critical issue that must be resolved
by the tribunal.
However, as a practical matter, proof of market power is often the
single most complex and expensive part of an antitrust case.270 It is also
266. See Mark R. Patterson, The Market Power Requirement in Antitrust Rule of
Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 46 (2000); see also
Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305,
312 (1987).
267. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir.
1983) (“Market power is not well suited to presentation in an adversary proceeding.”);
Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982).
268. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 275 at 39 (“Given the difficulties of proving
market power and even of defining a market, it is not clear that the interests of litigation
are best served by requiring a showing of market power.”); see also Piraino, supra note
33, at 1754 (“Even in recent years, plaintiffs have been reluctant to bring a rule of
reason case because its evidentiary hurdles are so difficult to meet. It is particularly
burdensome for a plaintiff to prove that a defendant has sufficient market power to
adversely affect competition in the relevant market.”).
269. The same does not hold true in criminal prosecutions. A conspiracy, once
formed, violates the Sherman Act, and it is not a defense that the unlawful conspiracy
would not have achieved its objectives. Moreover, the types of cases brought under the
rule of reason are not prosecuted criminally.
270. See supra notes 128, 274.
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rife with potholes for plaintiffs, and with opportunities for guilty
defendants to evade liability because of the plaintiffs’ burden of
persuasion on the murky and contestable issues involved. Proof of
market power will frequently involve detailed analysis of the proper
definition of the relevant product and geographic markets;271 the
defendant’s market share;272 the identities and market shares of other
existing market participants;273 entry conditions and trends;274 the
identity, proximity and relative strength of potential entrants;275
consumer substitution and cross-elasticities of demand;276 supply-side
substitution;277 as well as inferences from subjective sources such as
from the internal documents of market participants and opinions of
expert observers.278 Economics experts are easily (if expensively) hired
to disagree on nearly every aspect of this jigsaw puzzle of issues.279
Drawing a conclusion about the ability of defendants collectively to alter
271. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 470 (1992)
(“[M]arket definition generally determines the result of the case.”); see also Robert
Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1805, 1806-13 (1990).
272. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 470.
273. Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 829 (6th Cir. 2011); see also JOE S.
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8 (2d ed. 1968) (“The condition of entry . . .
determines the relative force of potential competition as an influence or regulator on the
conduct and performance of sellers already established in a market.”).
274. See Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“The courts generally allow the defendant to rebut inferences of market power by
showing easy entry conditions.”) (citing and quoting 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 532a (1995)).
275. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 628 (1974) (“The
sight of a particular firm ‘waiting at the market’s edge’ may emphasize the entry threat,
but it is ease of entry, not necessarily an identifiable potential entrant, that limits present
market power by reminding existing firms that high profits will attract outsiders.”)
(citing and quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ¶ 517 (1967)).
276. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38 (1984); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 32425 (1962).
277. See, e.g., Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246,
253 (C.D. Cal. 1984); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948);
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 940 (1976).
278. Andrew I. Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning the Increasingly fine Line Between
the Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 663 (1997).
279. On the use of expert testimony in antitrust litigation, see generally id.
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market conditions to the detriment of consumers often involves a vast
theoretical and empirical undertaking, if it can be accomplished at all.
“Identifying market power in the markets encountered in litigation is
often difficult, and quantifying market power with anything approaching
precision is frequently impossible.”280
Aside from practical concerns, the conceptual difficulties
associated with proof of market power in litigation are truly legion.
First, the various definitions of the term “market power” can present
problems because there is no single definition that courts employ.
“Market power” and “monopoly power” are often conflated in the case
law. The Supreme Court has defined monopoly power as “the power to
control prices or exclude competition.”281 Controlling prices and
excluding competition are two different things, and especially the latter
has received little attention in the case law and it is unclear if the
concept applies in a Section 1 case.
One variant of the definition based on the power to control prices
was offered by leading antitrust law and economics scholars Landes and
Posner in their influential 1981 article, “Market Power in Antitrust
Cases.”282 Landes and Posner defined market power as a firm’s power to
raise and maintain prices above competitive levels without losing so
many sales that it must rescind the increase.283 Their definition proved
influential and has often been used by the courts.284 Nevertheless, that
definition contains well-recognized holes. A rival that introduces a new
and better product often may profitably charge prices “above the
competitive levels” for existing products, but that does not normally
equate to any sort of market power that antitrust ought to be concerned
with. For another example, even a perfect cartel (or monopolist) faces
upper limits on its ability to raise prices – the sky is never the limit. Put
somewhat differently, a monopolist can appear to face competition from
products that would not be regarded as substitutes at competitive prices,
but those products might nevertheless draw consumer substitution
280.
281.

HOVENKAMP, supra note 124, at 80.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391, 426 n.26

(1956).
282. Landes & Posner, supra note 284, at 939; see also 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 501 (1985).
283. Landes & Posner, supra note 284, at 937.
284. See, e.g., Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 491 F.3d 380, 388 (8th
Cir. 2007); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690, 695 (7th
Cir. 2006) (citing Landes & Posner, supra note 284).
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simply because of the monopoly pricing: thus the monopolist appears
not to be a monopolist precisely because it is one.285 Thus the definition
yields both false positives, treating a new entrant with an innovative
product’s price advantage as having its market power, and false
negatives, such as where a monopolist cannot raise prices simply
because they are already at the monopolist’s profit-maximizing levels.
More often, though, the problem with the Landes/Posner definition is a
more basic practical one: just what is the competitive price for a widget?
The plaintiff’s case presumes that actual prices have been inflated by
collusion, but proving the “but for” competitive price that would have
existed in the absence of collusion is likely to be theoretical and mostly
conjectural.
As an alternative to power over price, market share thresholds have
often been used as a marker for market power, and courts frequently
treat high market shares as equating to market power.286 However, even
if there were consensus about what percentage constitutes market power,
market shares are simply a historic measure of past sales and not
necessarily accurate in predicting the power of sellers to collude and
control prices on current or future transactions. Even a 100% market
share is not decisive: for example, presumably the last umbrella repair
shop in Waterbury, Connecticut had a 100% market share until it too
finally went out of business, but it probably had no dangerous power
over consumers just before it did. Yet courts often rely heavily on
market shares as determinative of market power,287 and the federal
agencies’ various articulations of antitrust law also emphasize market
share calculations as supporting prima facie or preliminary assessments
of market power, although courts and agencies explicitly also take other

285. This is commonly referred to as the “Cellophane Fallacy” based on the
Supreme Court’s erroneous analysis in United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 351
U.S. 377 (1956). See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 128 (1976) (discussing the so-called “cellophane fallacy”); see also
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 103-05 (2d Cir. 1995).
286. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 470 (1992)
(“Because market power is often inferred from market share, market definition
generally determines the result of the case.”); Pitofsky, supra note 279, at1806-13.
287. See, e.g, Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 470 (“Because market power is often
inferred from market share, market definition generally determines the result of the
case.”); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (“Similarly, a
high market share indicates market power only if the market is properly defined to
include all reasonable substitutes for the product.”).
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factors into account.288 Market share as a marker for market power
sometimes presents no practical problems, but in other cases it does. For
example, a market during its research and development stage has by
definition no sales from which to make such a calculation.
As another alternative, some have advocated that a “definition
keyed to elasticity of demand is more accurate and comprehensive than
any alternative.”289 Economic theory indicates that firms in competitive
markets will price at levels where demand is elastic. Elasticity of
demand takes into account the willingness of consumers to switch away
from the seller’s products in response to price increases.290 However,
even adherents of this approach, as a matter of theory, concede that it is
often not a practical measure in the context of litigation, which drives
the matter back to more observable measures that are less theoretically
sound. Because “direct measurement of elasticity will often not be
possible, surrogates are used and are important. The most widely used
surrogate measure of market power is to . . . examine market shares,
entry barriers and potential competition.”291 Furthermore, to avoid the
problem of the Cellophane fallacy, cross-elasticities need to be
measured against a theoretical “competitive market price,” which is a
speculative matter at best.
There are also other ways in which market power can be
established, most notably by direct evidence. 292 The point here is not to
debate the most practical and theoretically sound definition of market
power for purposes of Section 1 litigation, but merely to indicate that if
proof on this issue is required for a particular plaintiff’s case, it is far
288. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS ¶ 3.33
(F.T.C. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div. 2000) (“In assessing whether an
agreement may cause anticompetitive harm, the Agencies typically calculate the market
shares of the participants and of the collaboration.”); 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 1.4 (F.T.C. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div.). See Am. Council of
Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 185
F.3d 606, 623 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[M]arket share is only a starting point for determining
whether monopoly power exists, and the inference of monopoly power does not
automatically follow from the possession of a commanding market share.”).
289. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 44, at 29.
290. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 469 (“[T]he extent to which one market
prevents exploitation of another market depends on the extent to which consumers will
change their consumption of one product in response to a price change in another, i. e.,
the “cross-elasticity of demand.”)
291. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 44.
292. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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from clear just what the plaintiff is supposed to prove or how he is
supposed to prove it. In some cases this will not matter, such as where
the defendants obviously have exerted control over the market through
collusion. In many other cases it will be decisive and yet elusive.
It seems a simple enough question: Does a rule of reason plaintiff
need to prove market power? 100 years of jurisprudence has failed to
deliver a coherent answer. Although there are arguments for and against
such a requirement, leaving the matter unsettled undermines antitrust as
a legal regime by deterring meritorious claims when litigation costs
cannot be predicted with reasonable certainty and by undermining the
rule of law.293
The Supreme Court’s most recent statement about the issue was in
Leegin:
The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a
practice restrains trade in violation of § 1. Under this rule, the fact
finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether
a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an
unreasonable restraint on competition. Appropriate factors to take
into account include specific information about the relevant business
and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect. Whether the businesses
involved have market power is a further, significant consideration
294
(emphasis added).

Does this mean that a plaintiff in a vertical restraints case is
required to prove that the defendants had market power, or not? Market
power is a “significant consideration” among other “factors,” which
suggests that proof is not required, but may be merely useful. Given the
cost and complexity of introducing this issue into all vertical restraints
cases, this is not the clearest or most desirable way to leave the matter.
In Cal. Dental, the Court’s most expansive recent application of the
rule of reason, neither the majority nor Justice Breyer’s dissent sheds
any light on this issue. In his dissent, Justice Breyer analyzed the dental
association’s ban on price and quality advertising under “a rule of
reason” and identified as one of the four “classical, subsidiary antitrust
questions” whether the parties have enough market power to make a
293. Additional litigation burdens for cases requiring proof of market power are also
well-known. Defining product and geographic dimensions of competition is, again, a
complex theoretical and evidentiary matter on which paid experts will disagree.
294. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-86 (2007)
(emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).
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difference. However, when he approached that issue, he expressed some
uncertainty about whether market power is really an element of a rule of
reason case, instead stating: “I shall assume that the Commission must
prove one additional circumstance, namely, that the Association’s
restraints would likely have made a real difference in the
marketplace.”295 He cites a solitary authority in support of this
assumption.296 The cited authority hardly supports the notion that proof
of “market power” is a requisite element of a rule of reason case, but
instead observes that proof is generally required of the defendants’
“significant role” in the market, but also observing that “what
constitutes sufficient proof for this purpose will vary enormously….”297
Thus this cite was presumably in support of Justice Breyer’s own doubts
about whether market power is indeed a requisite element of proof in a
rule of reason case, and thus the assumption for rhetorical purposes.
Proceeding from this assumption, Justice Breyer easily found market
power, citing from the record evidence that the association had a market
share exceeding 90% in one region, and generally over 75% throughout
the state of California and that there were high entry barriers.298
In contrast to Justice Breyer’s dissent, the majority paid almost no
attention to the issue of market power. The opinion recited the ALJ’s
determination that market power was not shown attrial but did not need
to be,299 the Commission’s contrary finding that market power was
established, a dissenting Commissioner’s finding that market power was
not shown, and the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that substantial evidence
supported the Commission’s finding of market power.300 The majority
opinion made no selection among these diverse views as to whether
market power had in fact been established by the FTC, or, more
importantly, whether it needed to be established.
The very fact of this disagreement among so many justices (the
Court was split five-to-four on the appropriate mode of antitrust
analysis) in the Cal. Dental litigation is not surprising when one
considers that the Supreme Court has never unequivocally established
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782, 788 (1999) (emphasis added).
Id. (citing AREEDA, supra note 2 ¶ 1503)
See AREEDA, supra note 2 ¶ 1503.
Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 782.
Id. at 762.
In re Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. 190, 272 (March 25, 1996); Cal. Dental
Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 725, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1997); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC,
526 U.S. at 762-63.
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whether market power is or is not an essential element of a rule of
reason case. (It is of interest, of course, that so many disagreed not only
as to whether the issue needed resolution, but also on how it came out.)
Lower courts and the federal agencies have thus taken disparate
views. Some courts have seized on market power as a surrogate for
proof of actual anticompetitive effects, citing language to that effect in
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.301 There, the Supreme Court was
adjudicating a concerted refusal by dentists to provide certain services,
which the Court found to be a “naked” restraint but subject to some
degree of rule of reason analysis in light of the professional context. The
extent of rule of reason analysis, however, was slight, or as the Court put
it, “not a matter of any great difficulty.”302 In that particular context, the
Court stated:
Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market
power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for
genuine adverse effects on competition, “proof of actual detrimental
effects, such as a reduction of output,” can obviate the need for an
inquiry into market power, which is but a “surrogate for detrimental
303
effects.”

The lower courts are confused by this. Some, but not all, lower
courts have taken this to mean that in any case in which anticompetitive
effects must be shown, proof of market power is an alternative method
of proof, rather than an independently required element of plaintiff’s
case. For example, in United States v. Brown University,304 the Third
Circuit took the view that once plaintiff has established anticompetitive
effects or market power, the burden then shifts to the defendant “to
show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently procompetitive objective.”305 The market power alternative is likely to
dominate in courts that follow this rule. Courts have recognized that the
inability to prove actual anticompetitive effects is not uncommon. As
Professor Areeda observed, “[e]ven an elaborate trial will seldom enable
the tribunal to reach confident judgments about the past or future. We
cannot realistically hope to know and to weigh confidently all that bears
on competitive impact.”306 However, the alternative mode of proof at
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986).
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460 (citing and quoting AREEDA, supra note 2, ¶ 151).
5 F.3d 658 (1993).
Id.
AREEDA, supra note 2, ¶ 1500.
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least allows for the possibility of avoiding the complex theoretical and
evidentiary issues involved in proof of the contours of relevant markets
and the defendant’s power.
The Second Circuit has devised a different approach that defers the
market power issue until (at least) after the defendants have countered
plaintiff’s proof of anticompetitive effects with their own evidence of
procompetitive offsetting benefits.307 At that point: “the plaintiff must
then show that the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved
through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.
Typically, the starting point is to define the relevant market . . . and to
determine whether the defendants possess market power in the relevant
market.”308 However, even then the Second Circuit acknowledges that
“the precise role that market power plays in the rule of reason analysis is
unclear.”309 Indeed, another Second Circuit case endorsed an entirely
different analysis that puts proof of market power at the very beginning
of rule of reason proof:
For the government to prevail in a rule of reason case under Section
1, the district court concluded, and the parties do not argue
otherwise, that the following must be shown: As an initial matter, the
government must demonstrate that the defendant conspirators have
‘market power’ in a particular market for goods or services. Next,
the government must demonstrate that within the relevant market,
the defendants’ actions have had substantial adverse effects on
competition, such as increases in price, or decreases in output or
quality. Once that initial burden is met, the burden of production
shifts to the defendants, who must provide a procompetitive
310
justification for the challenged restraint.

307. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
308. Id. at 1332 (citing Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d
Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
309. Id.; see also Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs.,
996 F.2d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that “[t]he precise role that market power
plays in rule of reason analysis of horizontal combinations or conspiracies is a matter of
some dispute”).
310. United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003), accord New
York by Abrams v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(indicating that the purpose of condemning a restraint is only served where it has the
potential to bring about adverse market-wide harm to consumers).
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Thus the Second Circuit, which did not take issue with the trial
court’s approach in Visa, appears not to have resolved the matter.
Still other Circuits take additional and diverse approaches. The
Seventh Circuit has established a rigid “rule that substantial market
power is a threshold requirement of all rule of reason (as well as some
per se) cases.”311 The D.C. Circuit also appears to follow this approach.
In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., Judge Bork
wrote:
We might well rest, therefore, upon the absence of market power as
demonstrated both by Atlas’ 6% national market share and by the
structure of the market. If it is clear that Atlas and its agents by
eliminating competition among themselves are not attempting to
restrict industry output, then their agreement must be designed to
make the conduct of their business more effective. No third
312
possibility suggests itself.

Judge Bork’s analysis in Rothery Storage has been taken to
establish a “safe harbor” rule under which a defendant’s conduct will
under no circumstances be condemned in the absence of proof of market
power, a position advocated by some commentators.313
The Seventh Circuit approach finds support from the American Bar
Association Section of Antitrust law, whose Sample Jury Instructions
require all plaintiffs to prove the relevant market, and also provide: “In
determining if the restraint here substantially harmed competition you
should consider defendant’s market power and how much of the relevant
market was affected by defendant’s restraint.”314 By requiring the jury to
find that plaintiff proved a relevant market, and also requiring it to
consider the defendant’s market power, the Instructions essentially
311. Hardy v. City Optical Inc., 39 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Chi. Prof’l
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Gen.
Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984)
(plaintiff’s showing of defendants’ market power is a prerequisite to recovery).
312. 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
313. See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal
Agreements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize
Technology, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 579, 606 (1993) (advocating for the “safe harbor”
approach).
314. SAMPLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES A-6 (A.B.A. 1999
ed.); see also id. at A-7, n.2 (noting that “‘the meaning of market power’ in rule of
reason cases has not been clearly explained or defined by the Supreme Court”). The
authors do not, however, question whether proof of market power, on some definition
or other, is required.
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import a market power requirement for rule of reason cases. Notably,
other elements of proof are non-mandatory, such as that the jury “may
consider defendant’s purpose in imposing the restraint.”315
The result: Courts and commentators have, after 100 years, failed to
coalesce around any single view, and some Circuits appear to have
expressed no view at all.316
3. Theoretical or Actual Effects as a
Business Justification Defense?
Another missing piece is whether, and at what point, a rule of
reason analysis turns on actual marketplace effects rather than merely
plausible or conjectural ones. Proof of actual effects should play a very
different role than theoretical conjecture about possible or plausible
ones. Rule of reason analysis proceeds step-wise, and an early step is to
determine how much analysis is useful. This determination must be
made on the basis of theory coupled with common sense but without
much evidence, because the whole point of this inquiry is to determine
how much evidence the parties will eventually need to bring forward.
These threshold issues include whether there are plausible
anticompetitive effects that could flow from the restraint and whether
there might be offsetting efficiency justifications.
The ultimate and separate issue under any antitrust review is the
restraint’s actual net effects – does the restraint actually impair
competition and harm consumers.317 Actual effects and plausible ones
ought to be kept separate but they have become muddled in antitrust
decisions. The theoretically plausible effects arguments ought to be
front-loaded in the litigation, and merely to serve the court as it
establishes how much inquiry is required to resolve the case. Proof of
actual anticompetitive and procompetitive effects should be reserved for
315.
316.

Id. at A-7.
Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537,
546 (2d Cir.1993) (“The proper role of market power in the § 1 rule of reason analysis
has been characterized differently by the various circuits. Some courts require that a
plaintiff always show the defendant’s market power in order to state a § 1 claim . . . .
This court has not made a showing of market power a prerequisite for recovery in all §
1 cases.”).
317. The only exception is that per se rules allow for the possibility that conduct
without anticompetitive effects will at times be condemned. See FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
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later on because it makes no sense to require that parties to prove the
ultimate issue in the case merely to determine how much they must
prove.
Here, again, Cal. Dental contributes to the confusion by blurring
the distinction between theoretical effects and actual ones:
[B]efore a theoretical claim of anticompetitive effects can justify
shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of
procompetitive effects, as quick-look analysis in effect requires,
there must be some indication that the court making the decision has
properly identified the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive
effects and considered whether the effects actually are
318
anticompetitive.(emphasis added)

Whether a case can proceed as a quick-look review ought to be
decided early on and without requiring empirical evidence from either
party. It is pointless to put the Court and the parties to the trouble and
expense of a full-blown rule of reason trial to determine if a quick look
review would have sufficed. Yet Cal. Dental forces a Section 1 plaintiff
at the very outset of the case to establish “whether the effects are
actually anticompetitive” in order to counter purely theoretical economic
justifications offered by a defendant. A plaintiff’s failure to produce
such evidence on actual effects renders a quick-look analysis
inappropriate and relieves the defendant of a “burden to show empirical
evidence of procompetitive effects.”
All that the defendant provided in Cal. Dental was purely
theoretical support for its position that restricting price advertising in
that particular context might increase, rather than diminish, output. The
Court explored these speculative justifications in considerable depth
(and without any apparent skepticism) to conclude that the lower court
had prematurely shifted the burden to the defendant. Based on academic
abstract explorations of some unusual demand attributes that might
pertain in some markets for professional services, the Court held that
plaintiff had not met its burden to submit the case to a quick look
evaluation. The result in Cal. Dental was that once the defendant
submitted a purely theoretical basis to support the case for an in-depth
rule of reason analysis, the trial court was supposed to have reverted to
the plaintiff to establish actual anticompetitive effects as an empirical
matter with more than just a theoretical case; to establish both “the

318.

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 775 (1999) (emphasis added).
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theoretical basis for the anticompetitive effects and . . . whether the
effects actually are anticompetitive.”319
This moves plaintiff’s proof of actual anticompetitive effects to the
fore, placing that burden on the plaintiff before the trial court has even
established the level of rule of reason review for the case. Because the
FTC had not produced evidence to establish actual anticompetitive
effects in the market for dental services, the decision does not indicate
what would happen if it had done so, but presumably defendant would
then be required to rebut with offsetting procompetitive actual effects.
All of this was supposed to have taken place in the context of a
determination of what sort of antitrust review should have been
required.
As thus structured in Cal. Dental, to determine whether a quick
look is “meet for the case,” plaintiff presents a theory of competitive
harm, defendant may counter with a theory of competitive justification
or offsetting efficiencies, and then plaintiff must proceed with an
evidentiary presentation to establish actual anticompetitive effects,
possibly followed by defendants’ factual rebuttal. The parties are thus
drawn into a potentially full-blown rule of reason case that is triggered
by a purely theoretical, abstract and conjectural defense.
The effectiveness of this strategy for the dental association, in the
context of an agreement among competitors with market power not to
advertise prices, indicates just how likely the invited strategy will be to
succeed in the run of antitrust cases.
III. THE FTC’S ATTEMPT AT REFORM –
THE “INHERENTLY SUSPECT” FRAMEWORK
The FTC has devised a model for the rule of reason that begins by
categorizing the challenged restraint, and then proceeds according to a
decision tree based upon that categorization. The analysis derives from
cases dating as far back as 1988,320 and finds its first full exposition in
PolyGram Holdings.321
Under PolyGram Holdings, the first step in the analysis involves
the determination of whether the alleged restraint is one that is

319.
320.
321.

Id.
In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988).
See 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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“inherently suspect.”322 This determination is focused on proof of the
agreement itself rather than its effects, which are presumed based upon
the nature of the restraint. A restraint is categorized as inherently suspect
if, “based upon economic learning and the experience of the market, it is
obvious that a restraint of trade likely impairs competition.”323 Unlike
per se offenses, inherently suspect conduct is subject to a rebuttable
presumption of illegality. Thus, the categories of conduct that may be
deemed to be inherently suspect are not limited to the narrow categories
of price fixing, market allocations and group boycotts. However, courts
that have followed the FTC’s framework have described the classes of
“inherently suspect” conduct as bearing a “close family resemblance” to
per se offenses. Thus, the particular conduct that has fallen under this
approach has included an agreement between joint venturers not to price
compete on related products outside the joint venture for a period
leading up to the venture’s own product launch;324 coordination of
bidding to payment plans by independent physicians;325 and a multiple
listing service rule restricting the listing of limited-service options and
excluding discount listings from default search results.326
If the restraint is so characterized, the next step requires the
defendant to rebut the presumption of illegality by establishing a
plausible and legally permissible justification. This requires proof that
either the context of the particular market in question deflects the
presumption that would normally apply, or that there are offsetting
competitive benefits flowing from the restraint. If defendants offer such
a rebuttal, the court (or FTC) can either reject it on its face if the tribunal
“can confidently conclude, without adducing evidence, that the restraint
very likely harmed consumers.”327 Alternatively, the plaintiff can
provide the tribunal with sufficient evidence to show that
anticompetitive effects are in fact likely. Finally, the defendants can
produce evidence that consumers are not harmed at all or that the
restraint’s net effects are competitively virtuous.328
322. Id. at 32-33, 35-36 (citing In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110
F.T.C. 549 (1988)).
323. Id. at 36.
324. PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’g In re
Polygram Holding, Inc., No. 9298, 136 F.T.C. 310 (2003).
325. N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’g in part
In re N. Tex. Specialty Physicians, 140 F.T.C. 715 (2005).
326. In re Realcomp II, Ltd., F.T.C. Docket No. 9320 (Oct. 30, 2009).
327. Id.
328. Id.
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What is useful in the FTC’s “inherently suspect” mode of analysis
is that for certain rule of reason cases it provides an avenue to resolve
claims without resort to litigation over market effects, which is often
speculative, indeed generally inherently so. The proof of marketplace
impact is tested with so-called “but-for” analysis, which requires the
fact-finder to weigh the prognostications of competing hired experts
about the world as it would have been absent the alleged restraint. This
aspect of antitrust litigation is high-cost, low-return. Where a claim falls
short of suitable application of a per se rule, the “inherently suspect”
model allows the court to weigh the defendants’ proffered justifications
against the inherent anticompetitive effects.329
This benefit follows from the return by the FTC to a categorical
approach to at least the most inherently suspect sorts of restraints. Rather
than leaving these restraints to the literal terms of Cal. Dental, the
“inherently suspect” model starts by characterizing the restraint and then
applying its rebuttable presumption. Under Cal. Dental’s directive,
every restraint is entitled to its own mode of analysis crafted as “meet
for the case.” The “inherently suspect” analysis establishes a generalized
mode of analysis for cases falling within the category. This approach is
unlikely to condemn desirable marketplace conduct because it is limited
to conduct that is closely related to per se offenses. It is also of value in
streamlining litigation and lending a measure of predictability to the
law.
There are frailties, however, with the FTC’s “inherently suspect”
framework. First, it is limited to restraints that are so obviously
offensive as to be arguably per se violations. The agreement in
PolyGram not to discount or advertise competing products that were not
part of the joint venture was the sort of joint venture spillover collusion
that the D.C. Circuit observed “looks suspiciously like a naked price
fixing agreement between competitors.”330 The agreement in Realcomp
II had no apparent purpose other than to impair innovative competition
from discount providers of real estate brokerage services. One element
of the FTC’s case, for example, was that the Realcomp members’ rule
imposed a “minimum service requirement” which directly eliminated
competition along an important dimension of consumer choice with the
obvious potential for forcing more services on them at higher cost

329.
330.

PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 37.
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(which was not surprisingly found to have been the intent).331 Thus,
“inherently suspect” as a category has in its quite limited experience
applied a truncated analysis only to conduct that might plausibly be
condemned without any analysis at all.
Another frailty is that the “inherently suspect” framework has
failed to gel into an unambiguous mode of analysis. This is partly
because the framework has only been applied in a small number of
recent cases. However, those applications have generated considerable
confusion. Realcomp II in particular undermines the potential value of
the model because the opinion of the Commission in that case purported
to apply “inherently suspect” framework but at the same time engaged
in elaborate fact-finding on the very complex issues that the model
purports to avoid: market power and actual anticompetitive effects. For
no apparent reason, the FTC’s opinion lays out and then applies three
different modes of analysis, including “inherently suspect,” actual
anticompetitive effects and market power analysis, and then proceeds to
apply all three.
Here, for completeness, we address all three of these modes of
analysis. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, although it is
convenient to treat each of these modes of analysis separately, the
Court’s decisions, particularly California Dental, also make clear
that all of these forms of analysis are simply different means to
pursue the same ‘essential inquiry. . . - whether or not the challenged
332
restraint enhances competition.’

There is not much value in a truncated mode of analysis if its
application invites excursions into the same difficult areas as a fullblown analysis. Realcomp II can be seen as a highly defensive
application of the “inherently suspect” framework, or even a retreat
from it. If the whole point of truncated analysis is to avoid the costly,
time-consuming and potentially confusing excursions into complex
issues, it makes little sense to indulge in those very excursions in a case
that calls for truncated analysis. The FTC’s opinion undermines the
value of truncated categorical analysis in the interest of “completeness,”
when completeness is the very thing that truncated analysis seeks to
avoid. If completeness were always a virtue, then categorical framework
to permit truncated analysis would necessarily always be a vice.

331.
332.

In re Realcomp II, Ltd., F.T.C. Docket No. 9320 op., 27 (Oct. 30, 2009).
Id. at 20 (quotation marks omitted).
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The FTC’s truncated analysis for restraints that are categorized as
“inherently suspect” could be harnessed to alleviate some of the
confusion left in the wake of Cal. Dental by returning to a categorical
framework that Cal. Dental essentially dismissed. However, it is a
nascent framework with little decisional law development, and it has
been obscured by the FTC’s defensive application of the doctrine.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
There are three steps that the Supreme Court (or Congress) could
take to alleviate the problems that have been identified with the rule of
reason. First, Board of Trade should be abandoned. Its articulation of the
rule of reason standard is too open-ended to guide courts through the
maze of issues it includes as relevant to antitrust conspiracy analysis.
Second, Cal. Dental should also be overruled as setting an unworkable
standard, indeed as having abandoned standards altogether. Finally, the
Court should return Section 1 to categorical analysis. If the categories of
“per se,” “truncated or quick look,” and “full-blown” are deemed too
likely to generate false outcomes, then the solution is not necessarily to
abandon all hope of predictability and transparency in antitrust law.
Instead, the courts should begin the task of generating categories that
work.
A. ABANDONING BOARD OF TRADE
There is a commanding scholarly consensus that the oft-repeated
rule of reason standard enunciated in Board of Trade has done more
harm than good. It ought to be jettisoned. Board of Trade’s most famous
and enduring statement of the rule of reason is fairly regarded by careful
students of antitrust law as “among the most damaging language in the
history of Sherman Act jurisprudence.” A first important step that the
Supreme Court could take to eliminate some of the problems with rule
of reason antitrust litigation would be to overrule that case, and in
particular to repudiate its language.
There is no particular reason why the articulation of the rule of
reason in this one case should be left in place. The Court has not
hesitated to repudiate what it comes to regard as ill-advised articulations
of legal standards, however well-worn they may be. In Bell Atlantic
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Corp. v. Twombly,333 the Court repudiated the time-honored language
that had summarized the notice pleading standard from Conley v.
Gibson.334 The language from the Conley decision that drew the
Twombly court’s particular consternation was its most frequently quoted
standard for evaluating a complaint under Rule 8:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course,
the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
335
to relief.

That “no set of facts” language had been relied in the vast majority
of published rulings on motions to dismiss federal complaints.336 The
Court in Twombly not only adjusted the standards for notice pleading,
but explicitly denounced and “interred” its language: “Conley’s ‘no set
of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away
long enough . . . .”337
Any legal standard should at a minimum be articulated with
sufficient clarity to guide the conduct of those who are subject to its
requirements. Board of Trade does no such thing. It instead invites
judicial inquiry into a nearly limitless array of obscure factors, it offers
no prescription for how any of those ought to be weighed, and it has
failed after more than ninety years to yield consistent answers to some
of the most basic questions presented in Section 1 litigation, and it has
no discernible scholarly support. To the contrary, the Court has ignored
a steady drumbeat of criticism of this precedent.338 It has been
“questioned and criticized” long enough.
B. OVERRULING CAL. DENTAL
If scholars agree that Board of Trade’s articulation of the rule of
reason is confusing, there ought to be at least an equal consensus that
Cal. Dental only made matters worse. It too should be discarded insofar
333.
334.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007).
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
335. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
336. A LEXIS search of Conley’s “no set of facts” language yields in excess of
3,000 cases.
337. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 124-128.
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as it lays out an ill-conceived burden shifting process, and also as to the
empty standard it prescribes for determining how much of an inquiry is
appropriate in antitrust cases under Section 1. Flexibility in antitrust
analysis has its value, but that value is not limitless and nor should the
flexibility of substantive standards be limitless. An “enquiry meet for the
case” goes too far in the direction of devoiding the rule of reason of any
standard whatsoever. Along with “no set of facts” and the liturgy from
Board of Trade, “an enquiry meet for the case” should be interred.
Predictability and transparency are particularly desirable qualities
for antitrust conspiracy law. Most business collaboration is more
nuanced than the sort of criminal price fixing and market allocation that
draws unequivocal antitrust condemnation. This vast region of economic
cooperation is of enormous importance to global economic well-being,
and includes conduct ranging from standard setting (without which the
modern technology economy could not exist) to more old-fashioned
product distribution arrangements. The failure of antitrust law to provide
reasonably clear guidance in this region of activity cannot help but
impose pointless costs. Business managers planning their company’s
affairs can only respond to undecipherable antitrust rules in one of two
ways: either by resolving doubt in favor of their proposed conduct, or
alternatively resolving doubts against the considered course of action.
Optimists will tend to impair competition by violating the standards that
ought to be in place; pessimists will tend to compete too cautiously (and
thus contributing to the “false positive” problem that seems to have
animated much of the judicial drift toward blunting antitrust rules).
Courts are equally confounded, as the above discussion explores. It
ought to be regarded as unacceptable that the rule of reason after 100
years has failed even to resolve such basic matters as whether market
power is a requisite element of proof and how a court should decide
whether a full-blown analysis is even required.
As Professor Stucke has argued, the rule of reason does not even
comply with rule of law standards and Cal. Dental actually aggravated
matters.339 As Stucke points out, the rule of reason undermines the rule
of law in the context of antitrust by providing market participants with
inadequate advance assurance about how the power of government will
be exerted upon them. 340 Cal. Dental moves the rule of reason further
from rule of law norms by obscuring until after the fact the legal
339.
340.

Stucke, supra note 10.
Id. at 1422-29, 1446-60.
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standard that will apply to conduct. Conduct that might be found to be
permissible under one level of review can easily be condemned under a
more stringent one, as the tortured path of the litigation in Cal. Dental
itself makes clear. An “enquiry meet for the case” amounts to ex post
facto regulation because what is “meet” is indeterminate until the
conduct has already been engaged in; until it gets evaluated by a
tribunal. Thus the substantive standard of review announced in Cal.
Dental ought to be repudiated.
The procedural structuring of civil antitrust litigation should also
achieve predictability, administrability and fairness in the resolution of
cases. Cal. Dental achieves none of these ends. It’s shifting of an
unspecified evidentiary burden to the plaintiff in response to defendants’
purely theoretical articulation of a plausible and conjectural justification
makes no sense as part of a litigation process for determining what the
evidentiary burdens of the parties should be. For one thing, it is far too
easy for defendants to articulate some sort of efficiency justification that
might have had something to do with their collusive conduct. The
litigation process becomes unjustifiably skewed if the plaintiff must bear
the burden of adducing evidence sufficient to show “actual
anticompetitive effects” – possibly before pre-trial discovery has even
proceeded.341
Cal. Dental and the Court’s recent aversion to “false positives”
have made perfection the enemy of the good. Recall Areeda’s
admonition that “[e]ven an elaborate trial will seldom enable the tribunal
to reach confident judgments about the past or future We cannot
realistically hope to know and to weigh confidently all that bears on
competitive impact.”342 Moreover, from the court’s perspective, the
whole point of limiting rule of reason evidence is to advance the
efficient use of judicial resources. That is not the result of Cal. Dental’s
process. Thus from a procedural vantage point, as well as the substantive
one, this decision causes mischief and should be overruled.
C. RESTRUCTURING THE RULE OF REASON
The rule of reason should be reinvigorated in the interest of both
predictability and the underlying social value of antitrust enforcement.
The ultimate substantive law standards of conduct are not in doubt:
Section 1 prohibits private non-immune conduct that restrains
341.
342.

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 775 (1999).
AREEDA, supra note 2.
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competition more than it promotes it. This substantive standard should
equate to, or at least conform quite closely to, the results of litigation
under the rule of reason. That is, conduct that, on balance, promotes
competition should be adjudicated as lawful, and conduct that, on
balance, harms competition should be adjudicated as unlawful. That the
current rule of reason is widely regarded as “euphemism for nonliability”343 indicates just how poorly the rule performs in promoting the
value of antitrust. At a time that has witnessed an historic explosion of
global adoption of antitrust as a legal paradigm, the United States has
managed to undermine its own framework by eroding any content that
the rule of reason ever had, while subjecting nearly all concerted activity
to this unguided evaluation. That a reasoned argument has been made
that the rule of reason does not even live up to the modest demands of
the rule of law indicates just how little predictability the rule of reason
provides.
There needs to be a simplified, consistent and predictable
substantive legal framework for Section 1 that is capable of sorting good
or neutral conduct from bad in an administrable manner. The demise of
categorical analysis under Section 1 has made this impossible. It thus
stands to reason that categorical analysis needs to be restored. It is no
answer to say that the “rigid” categories of yesterday yielded false
positives. Not only is there no empirical evidence to support that
contention, but every rule of law is capable of some mischief – which is
not to say laws should be abandoned.
Instead of abandoning categorical analysis in the interest of
perfection, the categories should be developed along more refined lines.
As a starting point, there ought at least to be four identifiable categories
of antitrust review under Section 1:
The Per Se Illegal Category (Irrebuttably Presumed
Anticompetitive). The per se category includes naked horizontal
restraints on price, output, innovation and market access.
a. These require no inquiry into market context or effects, and
are irrebuttably presumed to be illegal.
b. Defendants should be able to challenge the characterization
of their conduct as falling into one of these per se forbidden
categories in an orderly, predictable fashion. For example,

343.

Posner, supra note 126, at 14.
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the wisdom of the BMI decision344 could be accommodated
by allowing defendants to articulate (as was done in that
case) how the restraint benefits consumers in a way that
cannot be achieved via other less restrictive alternatives.
Sufficient proof on this point should divert the case to the
“inherently suspect” category below.
The Inherently Suspect Category (Rebuttable Presumption of
Illegality). Inherently suspect horizontal restraints include conduct
similar to per se offenses in joint venture, league sports, and
professional contexts.
a. This category should follow the framework set out in
PolyGram345 without the unnecessary and duplicative resort
to more complex modes of analysis applied in Realcomp II.
346
These restraints are rebuttably presumed to be
anticompetitive, subject to defendants’ proffering sufficient,
non-pretextual justifications to show net procompetitive
effects.
b. Market definition, market power and anticompetitive
effects are irrelevant to this mode of analysis.
Presumptively Lawful Category (Rebuttable Presumption of
Legality). In the modern economic context, it is likely that most
interaction among rivals does not adversely affect the marketplace, and
much collaboration is essential for competition to exist. Standard setting
(including safety, interoperability and other standards established with
horizontal collaboration), patent licensing, collaborative research and
development are just a few examples.
a. Conduct falling into this category should be presumed
lawful, and the burden should thus shift to the plaintiff to
establish that the agreement is anticompetitive.
b. Courts should clarify that proof of anticompetitive effects
can be established alternatively by proof of market power
(and thus relevant market definition) or direct proof so that
not all cases will be weighed down with the complexities of
cross-elasticity analysis implicit in market power evidence.
Per Se Lawful Category. Commentators have toyed with the idea that
courts should develop a category for conduct that is irrebuttably

344.
345.
346.

Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
In re Realcomp II, Ltd., F.T.C. Docket No. 9320 (Oct. 30, 2009).
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presumed to be lawful, although the argument has been limited to
vertical restraints.347
It is of course true that categorizing conduct as, say, “a horizontal
output restraint in a professional context,” may in some cases lead to
condemnation of conduct that in a perfect world might be tolerated. It
bears consideration, though, whether the Republic could not have
endured the absence of the California Dental Association’s rule against
across-the-board discounts. Categorically speaking, the Association’s
rule should not have admitted a nearly full-blown rule of reason
excursion into the speculative and highly unlikely possibility that dental
patients actually consume more services as a consequence of the
restraint alleged in that case. Instead, it should have been characterized
as a preliminary matter for what it was: a price restraint in a market for
professional services. The defendants should then have borne the burden
of establishing that which Justice Souter conjured up in his opinion,
although one has reason to doubt that the Association would then have
prevailed.
1. A Partial Response to Lemley and Leslie
Lemley and Leslie have argued that categories are ill-suited to
antitrust analysis and should be largely abandoned altogether; that
“enthusiasm for taxonomy has run amok in antitrust law, with
pernicious consequences.”348 Aside from a very small category of per se
offenses, they argue that categorical analysis has infected antitrust law
with a strong tendency toward error. The central concern behind their
argument is consistent with the thrust here, which is that antitrust law
has become intolerably muddled. Yet they come to a seemingly opposite
conclusion and advocate jettisoning categories from the rule of reason.
Their argument starts from the questionable premise that categories
continue to dominate in antitrust notwithstanding Cal. Dental;349 and
they then argue that categorical analysis in antitrust has become so
incoherent that it should be even more thoroughly abandoned. In
347. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Next Step In The Antitrust Treatment Of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
348. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 19, at 1210.
349. Id. at 1217 (“The Court’s attempt to recharacterize its decades-old approach to
antitrust analysis should not be understood as an abandonment of categorical decisionmaking.”).
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particular, the dividing line between “quick look’ and “full blown” rule
of reason analysis is in their view untenable:
The evolution of quick look analysis has made matters worse, as
confusion over whether a challenged restraint falls within the “quick
look” or requires “full-blown rule of reason analysis” introduces
350
significant uncertainty into antitrust litigation.

Furthermore, they argue, categorical analysis is subject to
manipulation by plaintiffs, who try to force conduct into a forbidden
category; and (relatedly) categorical analysis also produces false
positives, or condemnation of benign conduct. At the heart, their
objection to resort to categories in antitrust analysis is that it may lead to
error, through manipulation or otherwise. “When courts focus on
categorization instead of competitive effects, it increases the probability
of mistakes.”351
Lemley and Leslie then argue that antitrust law should operate
much like tort negligence law, relying on broad standards rather than
categories. The standard that they argue should apply is whether
competition is harmed by the alleged conduct. They would therefore
place substantial or even decisive weight on the court’s determination of
market power, on the ground that an absence of market power signals an
inability for the defendant or defendannts to adversely affect
competition or consumers. Their conclusion that antitrust law is now
muddled is consistent with the argument here, but their solution seems
flawed.
First, it is doubtful whether Lemley and Leslie are correct in
asserting that categorical antitrust analysis within the rule of reason
survived Cal Dental, which (as they acknowledge) explicitly moved in
another direction: “The truth is that our categories of analysis of
anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick
look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.” Most observers
agree that the Court dismantled the boundaries between categories of
conduct in favor of a continuum; that “quick look” and “full blown” are
merely part of a continuum between per se illegality at one end and
efficient or competitively neutral conduct at the other. Indeed, Lemley
and Leslie are virtually alone in attacking Cal Dental as having
maintained categories of analysis. Prof. Hovenkamp, for example,
350. Id. at 1225 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 899-900 (2007)).
351. Id. at 1260.
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concludes that “[i]n its California Dental Association . . . decision the
Supreme Court observed that there is no bright line between per se and
rule of reason analysis, but rather a continuum.”352 The lower courts
have also understood the Supreme Court to have shifted rule of reason
analysis to a continuum. In PolyGram, for example, the Court explained
that the categories of analysis courts refer to as “per se,” “quick look”
and “rule of reason” do not represent discrete categories of analysis, but
rather define a continuum:
It would be somewhat misleading, however, to say the “quick look”
is just a new category of analysis intermediate in complexity
between “per se” condemnation and full-blown “rule of reason”
treatment, for that would suggest the Court has moved from a
dichotomy to a trichotomy, when in fact it has backed away from
353
any reliance upon fixed categories and toward a continuum.

More importantly, even if they read Cal. Dental correctly, Lemley
and Leslie seem to understate the problems of moving antitrust to a
broad standards approach like negligence law. Virtually every problem
they identify as stemming from the application of categories in antitrust
law becomes aggravated by shifting to a standards approach. Their core
concern that antitrust categorical analysis is prone to uncertainty and
shifting standards seems odd to address by replacing categories of
review with none. Yet the more obscure antitrust law becomes, the more
(not less) likely that courts will misapply the law. A review that is “meet
for the case” provides no basis for businesses to conform their conduct
to the law’s requirements, or for judges and juries to render consistent
and predictable adjudications.
The authors’ reliance on tort law as a model for antitrust also seems
misplaced. Negligence law, unlike antitrust law, is state common law,
with standards that are responsive to local community norms of
behavior. In a negligence trial, jurors selected from a pool of local
residents are asked to judge a defendant’s conduct using the “reasonable
person” standard as their guide. Lemley and Leslie argue that this
352. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 116 (2005).
353. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also
Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 509 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating
that rule of reason and per se modes of analysis are “best viewed as a continuum, on
which the ‘amount and range of information needed’ to evaluate a restraint varies
depending on how ‘highly suspicious’ and how ‘unique’ the restraint is.”).
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“reasonableness” standard can also work in antitrust cases. But
negligence law is to some unavoidable and desirable extent local and
responsive to current customs.354 If a lot of people locally engage in
conduct of a certain sort, such as shooting guns to celebrate New Year’s
Eve, a local jury is unlikely to find that conduct unreasonable. Similarly,
as people become accustomed to talking on telephones while walking
down the street, such customs which at one time would have been
thought bizarre become normal and acceptable. Tort law adopts both to
these local standards and to evolving norms more generally. Antitrust
standards are supposed to work differently. Customs, particularly local
ones, are not supposed to set antitrust standards. Even if (as was at one
time the case) many producers of hardwood flooring operated in cartels
with rivals, that would not redeem the conduct or have any admissible
impact on the antitrust evaluation of the conduct. “Reasonableness” in
antitrust law sets neither localized standards nor ones that bend to
popular behaviors. There is no valid reason to submit the national
economy to such a mosaic of differing and changing value schemes that
may be found in different regions or depending on current business
practices. Instead, antitrust sets standards according to the objective
economic consequences of conduct.
Finally, their reliance on a market power screen to prevent error
ignores the great problems associated with proof of market power in
antitrust cases. Their legitimate concerns about error in antitrust
adjudication are poorly addressed by relying on juries or even lay judges
to define relevant markets accurately enough. Furthermore, proof of
market power more than any other single issue raises the cost of
litigation. So while in an ideal sense it would be preferable to screen out
cases where defendants lack the ability to do any harm, the practical
ability of courts to do that is limited, reaching questionable results at
enormous cost.

354. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 395 (West 2000) (“Customs of a
society at any given time are often important in tort law . . . . Courts sometimes
consciously depart from the community’s standards, as where the Constitution
demanded an end to segregated schools. But law follows as often as it leads, so courts
sometimes show a strong reluctance to depart from strong community customs or
practices.”).
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CONCLUSION
Outside the per se/rule of reason dichotomy, antitrust law should
develop categories of analysis that are more, rather than less, definite.
The rule of reason has never done this, and, as it is currently understood,
is at a historic nadir. The soft dichotomy that once existed between “full
blown” and “quick look” rule of reason analysis was never enough.
However, instead of abandoning the cause of clarification, courts should
embark on a process of refining categories of analysis based on
presumptions and shifting burdens of proof.
The rule of reason never worked well and has been subject to
nearly uniform criticism by scholarly observers. Its expanded role via
reversals of per se rules, coupled with the abandonment of categorical
analysis heralded by Cal. Dental, have only made matters worse. The
courts should adopt a scheme of presumptions, such as the one outlined
here, to bring some degree of order to antitrust litigation and analysis.
Categories of conduct should evolve to fall under a particular
presumption, thus treated as “presumptively lawful,” “presumptively
unlawful,” etc. By shifting the burden of proof to the party resisting a
presumption and allowing them to overcome it, the likelihood of error is
reduced. Over time, conduct types would emerge as falling within these
categories, which could simplify antitrust analysis for purposes of both
litigation and business planning.

